

Commonwealth Edison Company

QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 216 ★ CORDOVA, ILLINOIS 61242

August 3, 1972
BBS-72-5

50-265

Mr. J. F. O'Leary
Director, Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. O'Leary:

REF: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Unit II DPR-30 Appendix A
Sections 1.0.A.2. and 6.6.B.3.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the details regarding the failure of the inboard primary containment isolation valve in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC). The incident occurred at 4:00 P. M. on July 27, 1972 on Quad-Cities Unit II.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT & IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

During a reactor startup on Quad-Cities Unit II the RCIC inboard steam supply valve (1301-16) failed in the open position, reactor pressure at the time was 200 psi. Several attempts were made unsuccessfully to close the valve from the control room. The heatup was terminated while a drywell entry was made by the General Electric Shift Supervisor and Station Maintenance Department personnel to determine the nature of the problem. Investigation of the valve revealed that the malfunction was not mechanical but electrical and that an immediate repair was not possible. The situation was reported to the control room and an orderly shutdown and depressurization of the unit pursued. The outboard steam supply valve (1301-17) was manually closed to isolate the RCIC system.

INVESTIGATION AND REPAIR

An investigation performed by Station Electrical Maintenance revealed that the torque switch for the valve was faulty. An internal spring in the switch which normally resets the contacts after actuation had failed.

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
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CONCLUSION

The investigation indicated that the valve failure resulted from a defective torque switch. Once the torque switch was replaced the valve operated correctly. The system was still capable of isolating on a line break signal since the outboard valve was openable at all times. Also with the valve failed in the open position the system could have performed its intended safety function.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


B. B. Stephenson
Assistant Superintendent

RAN/dkp