

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 17 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14607

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

Ginna Station
August 13, 1975

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence 675-13: Personnel error which could prevent, or delay, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This is to confirm my phone call to Mr. Paul Kellogg on August 15, 1975 and a further phone call from Mr. Eldon Dwyer of your office the same day to report and discuss Abnormal Occurrence 675-13 at Ginna Station.

Just before 1400 on Friday, August 15, 1975, a control room operator was in the process of completing Procedure No. PT-2.3, Safeguards Valve Operation. He was starting instruction 6.5.10 on page 10 of the 12 page procedure. The first 4 valve operations in the instruction were for the 1B RHR pump and reads as follows:

6.5.10 Close MDV-851B (Recirc. to 1B RHR pump)

D

Open MDV-850B (Recirc. to 1B RHR pump)

D

Close MDV-850B (Recirc. to 1B RHR pump)

B

Open MDV-851B (Recirc. to 1B RHR pump)

B

Before actually operating the switch to close MDV-851B, he placed his initials in the space provided on the procedure alongside this operation. He then noticed that it was time for him to get the 1400 MW generation readings and he momentarily turned and asked the Head Control Operator to get the readings for him. He turned around to continue the procedure and he saw that the next step after the last step that he initialed was to Open MDV-850B. He had

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never closed MOV-851B, so when he operated the switch to open MOV-850B, a path was open from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to containment Sump B. Shortly after this operation the high level alarm in Sump B sounded in the control room followed shortly afterwards by a high level alarm in Sump A. By the time the operator realized what had happened and could get MOV-851B closed, approximately 12,000 gallons of Refueling Water Storage Tank water had run into Sump B, overflowed onto the containment basement floor, and drained through the floor drains to Sump A. The approximate time that containment integrity was violated was 3 minutes.

The PORC met at 1450, reviewed the occurrence and made the following recommendations:

- (a) Make an inspection of containment
- (b) Reprimand the control room operator
- (c) Have the Health Physics personnel take a particulate sample in the basement of containment
- (d) Pump the water from Sump B and inspect the Sump B area for any debris and also inspect the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank which is located in Sump B.

An inspection was made of containment at 1530. The only evidence of the water was several small puddles of water here and there on the floor, Sump B full of water, and an indication in several places that approximately 1" of water had been on the basement floor.

The plant continued operation at 100% power all during the occurrence and no operating problems have been encountered since the occurrence.

Charles E. Platt
Charles E. Platt
Superintendent

cc: G. J. Swarhtout, RG&E Corp.
L. D. White, Jr. RG&E Corp.
J. F. Sweet, RG&E Corp.
B. A. Snow, RG&E Corp.