

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

EVENT	DESCRIPTION
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SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION	
I	A	F	I	N	S	T	R	U	N	F	1	8	0	N
10		11	12 17					43	44 47				48	

09	This standard was not properly considered during PORC review of EM-142 Level Trans-	80
09	mitter LT-462 Installed In Place of LT-461 to Control LM-463F and LC-480. The IEEE	80
10	protection criteria stipulates that when an equipment failure(cont'd. on attached sheet)	80
FACILITY		METHOD OF

11	E	% POWER	100	OTHER STATUS	NA	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	d	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	Receipt of letter from N
7 8	9	10 12	13	44	45	46	80		
12	Z	CONTENT OF RELEASE	Z	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE	NA		
7 8	9	10 11	44	45	80				

NUMBER				TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	0	0	0	Z	NA

NUMBER			DESCRIPTION
1	4		NA

1	5	NA
7	8	9

TYPE			DESCRIPTION
1	6	2	NA

1	7	NA										
7	8	9										

18 NA S PDR
7 8 9

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7 8 9

PHONE: 716/546-2700, ext. 291-214

Cause Description (cont'd.)

in a control system can cause a condition requiring protective action and can also prevent the proper operation of a portion of that condition's protection system, then the remaining operational channels of the protection system must be capable of providing adequate protection in the event of a second random failure. LT-462, as a result of the circuitry change, was made part of the level control system, the Lo-Lo water level protection system, and the Lo S/G feedwater reactor trip logic. The investigation showed that the protection system was not able to provide adequate reactor trip protection in the event of a failure in LT-462 and with a second random failure, as required by the IEEE criteria.

The Committee discussed the results of the investigation and reviewed the status of steam generator level instruments with respect to the Technical Specification, Table 3.5-1. It was determined that loss of one level channel did not establish conditions less limiting than the limiting conditions required; however the PORC recommended to return level control to original status to restore conformance to the IEEE standard. This was accomplished on 9/2/75 using procedure EM-148, "Level Transmitter LT-461 to Control LT-463F and LC-480 in Place of Level Transmitter LT-462."



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649

LEON D. WHITE, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 536-2700

September 29, 1975



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: Unusual Event 75-06, Transfer of "A" Steam Generator level
control input signal from level transmitter LT-461 to level
transmitter LT-462
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Technical Specifications, Article 6.6.2b, the attached
report of Unusual Event 75-06 is hereby submitted. Two additional copies
of this letter and the attachment are enclosed.

Very truly yours,

L. D. White, Jr.
L. D. White, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Donald F. Knuth (30)
Mr. William G. McDonald (3)

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