



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
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ATTACHMENT B

October 29, 1973

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
BACKSEATING DISC MISLOCATION PROBLEM ON 2" DARLING VALVES

In accordance with Section 15.6.6.A.3.b of the Technical Specifications for Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27), this report describes a possible generic problem with a category of 2" gate valves installed at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The valves in question are 2", No. S-350 WDE welding end, outside screw and yoke, double disc gate valves with lip seals, and are manufactured by the Darling Valve and Manufacturing Company. The valves used at Point Beach Nuclear Plant are safety class I, ASA series 1500 lb. valves.

An investigation of excess letdown line leakage on September 15, 1973, lead to an inspection and subsequent repair of valve MOV-1299 on Unit 1 (excess letdown system root valve) on September 26, 1973. Inspection of the valve disclosed that its downstream seat protruded from the valve body such that if the valve disc was fully withdrawn from the guides, as allowed by its backseating ring, the disc could catch the "lip" of the seat ring when reinserting. Four marks on the lip of the downstream seat ring indicated that the disc had caught there during previous valve closings. Internal damage to the valve consisted of a fine vertical crack at the 12 o'clock position in the upper portion of the downstream seat ring. Two locating pins between the upstream and downstream discs of the split disc valve were found to be slightly bent also and some facial scratches to the down-stream disc were evident. There was no metal loss involved in the damage.

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Repair of the valve involved rounding the lip of the seat ring to prevent future hangups of the disc. The thin vertical crack in the downstream seat could not be fully lapped out during the repair. Accordingly, a manual valve was added to the system downstream of LMOV-1299 to back up the root valve. Valve LMOV-1299 thereby remains effective and operable as a remotely controlled root shutoff valve, but is considered not totally capable of effecting completely tight shutoff without some through-leakage.

At the time, measurements indicated that the location of the backseating ring on the valve stem was too low but this could not be assuredly determined. If such was the case, this would allow the split discs to fully clear the seat rings when the valve was fully open and backseated. The tendency for interference to occur between the downstream disc and seat during valve closing could be expected to increase if there was flow through the valve, creating a differential pressure which could swing the loose hanging disc onto the lip of the seat.

There are six similar 2" Darling valves in each unit at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. In addition to the above mentioned 1299 valve, valves 270A & B (normally open) are installed on the reactor coolant pump seal return lines. These valves are rarely operated in the life of the plant. Also, valves 598 and 599 on the reactor coolant system drain line are of this type. These valves are never operated during normal pressurized and power operation. The sixth similar valve on each unit is MOV-427 on the normal letdown line. The function of valve 427 is to close in the event of low pressurizer level and, in closing, cause the closure of the containment isolation valves 200 A, B and C, via an interlock. None of the Darling valves described in this report are containment isolation valves.

Valve LMOV-427 was investigated during a Unit 1 shutdown on October 13, 1973, after it was reported that it would not fully close remotely. Manual manipulation of the valve on September 28, 1973, had shown that at approximately one-half shut and again just prior to closing, the valve operation became sticky. Tests were conducted at that time to verify that LMOV-427 was capable of performing its primary function of initiating an isolation signal for the letdown line. The slightest movement of the valve off its backseat was found to be sufficient to activate the interlocks and close the AOV-200 letdown isolation valves.

Measurements indicated that the discs of LMOV-427 when

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
backseated cleared the seat rings and left the valve open to similar problems as experienced in IMOV-1299. Inspection showed no damage to valve IMOV-427 other than a slight marking of the upper edge of the seat ring, similar to that found in IMOV-1299. Before closing up the valve, the seat ring edges were rounded to aid in guiding the discs down between the seats. The "valve open" limit switch was then set for 2-1/4", 5/16" less than the maximum backseating position of 2-9/16". Valve cycling tests were then conducted satisfactorily.

During the same shutdown, valve IMOV-270B was cycled manually with no evidence of stickiness or disc hangup. At the completion of repair of IMOV-427, on October 13, 1973, it was concluded from measurements taken, operating experience and telephone discussions with the valve manufacturer, that, indeed, a dimension error could exist with respect to backseat locations on the stem. With these confirmations, it was concluded that all twelve valves of this type would require investigation on a schedule commensurate with the plant operating schedules.

Valves IMOV-1299, 2MOV-1299 and 2MOV-427 will be electrically limited similarly to IMOV-427. Valve IMOV-1299 will be completely changed out during a convenient shutdown following the receipt of a new valve. New valve stems with backseats located so that full opening of the valve will not permit the discs to lose the guide effect of the seats have been ordered and will be fitted in the remaining valves at convenient shutdowns. The service of the 598, 599 and 270A & B valves is such that it is not considered necessary to change the stems of these valves until the next refueling shutdown of each unit.

The nuclear steam supply system supplier has been informed about the problems encountered with these valves.

Very truly yours,



Senior Vice President

Sol Burstein

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations,
Region III