

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME: 01 I L D R S 2 14 15 00 - 00 00 00 -- 00 25 26 4 1 1 1 1 1 30 0 1 31 32

CATEGORY: 01 CON'T 57 58 REPORT TYPE: T 59 REPORT SOURCE: L 60 DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 2 3 7 68 EVENT DATE: 1 1 1 3 7 6 69 74 REPORT DATE: 1 1 2 3 7 6 75 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 7 8 9 DURING A WEEKEND MAINTENANCE OUTAGE, HPCI INJECTION VALVE MO 2 -  
03 7 8 9 2301-8 WAS FOUND TO BE IN THE CLOSED POSITION WITH ITS VALVE STEM  
04 7 8 9 SEVERED. THE VALVE WAS LAST OBSERVED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY DURING  
05 7 8 9 THE PREVIOUS REFUELING OUTAGE. THE VALVE IS LOCATED IN THE "X- AREA,"  
06 7 8 9 WHICH IS NOT ROUTINELY ACCESSIBLE DURING OPERATION. FROM THE  
07 7 8 9 (SEE ATTACHED SHEET)

SYSTEM CODE: S F 7 8 9 10 CAUSE CODE: E 11 COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X 12 17 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: N 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: C 6 6 5 44 47 VIOLATION: N 48

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 7 8 9 THE CAUSE OF THE VALVE STEM FAILURE CANNOT BE DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED  
09 7 8 9 AT THIS TIME. INSPECTION OF THE VALVE REVEALED THE PRESENCE OF SEV-  
10 7 8 9 ERAL INCHES OF WATER IN THE MOTOR OPERATOR, A CONDITION WHICH  
11 7 8 9 (SEE ATTACHED SHEET)

FACILITY STATUS: G 9 % POWER: 0 0 0 10 12 13 OTHER STATUS: NA 44 45 46 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C 45 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: DC GROUND ELECTRICAL INSPECTION 46 80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z 9 CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 44 45 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 46 80

## PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 7 8 9 11 TYPE: Z 12 DESCRIPTION: NA 13 80

## PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 7 8 9 11 12 DESCRIPTION: NA 80

## OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 7 8 9 NA 80

## LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE: Z 9 DESCRIPTION: NA 10 80

## PUBLICITY

17 7 8 9 NA 80

8304050139 770513  
PDR ADOCK 05000237  
S PDR

## ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 7 8 9 NA 80

19 7 8 9 80

NAME: GREGG REIMERS

PHONE: EXT. 265

#### EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

beginning of this fuel cycle until 10/12/76, the valve was cycled on a monthly basis with proper control room position indication. On 10/12/76, valve 2301-8 was taken out of service in the open position (according to position indication) in order to isolate a 250V DC ground which was present only when the valve was closed. The HPCI pump discharge line was then isolated by closing valve 2301-9. This is not a repetitive occurrence. (50-237/1976-66)

#### CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)

evidently produced the 250V DC system ground. Condensation from various leaks in the "X-area" apparently entered the valve operator via the control circuitry cable, which was not adequately sealed.

The valve stem failure may have been caused by several factors. The water accumulation found in the valve operator may have caused the operator torque switch contacts to remain energized momentarily after the valve seated, allowing the DC motor operator to compress and deform the valve stem. A design error has been identified in the 2301-8 valve control circuitry which causes the valve to cycle excessively during refueling surveillance testing. This cycling may have fatigued the valve stem after a period of several years. Additionally, it had been determined prior to this failure that the motor operators for valve 2301-8 and several other safety-related valves are oversized for the valve applications. The oversized operators may subject valve stems to higher stresses under conditions such as excessive cycling.

In our judgment, the valve stem failed on 10/12/76, when the valve was racked out in the open position. The valve was cycled at least twice in the course of determining the location of the 250V DC ground, and, had the stem been severed prior to the final complete cycle, the operator torque switch would not have tripped the motor, nor would the valve have subsequently "reopened."

During the month that HPCI was inoperable, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) was available and operable, as were the remaining ECCS subsystems. With the exception of the "B" core spray system, which was unavailable briefly in July, 1976, all other ECCS subsystems were operable during the entire fuel cycle.

Because parts are presently unavailable, valve 2301-8 has been clamped in the open position, and valve 2301-9 is being used to isolate the HPCI pump discharge. Both valves will be visually inspected on a monthly basis until repairs are completed. A modification request has been initiated to replace the motor operators on several safety-related valves with reduced-capacity units. Completion of this modification will preclude valve stem failures caused by oversized motor operators.

A modification request has been submitted to alter the 2301-8 valve control circuitry so as to eliminate excessive cycling during routine surveillance testing. In keeping with sound maintenance practices, steam and water leaks in the "X-area" will continue to be repaired or minimized wherever practicable.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)

Additionally, junction boxes and conduits in the "X-area" will be visually inspected for leak-tightness during the next refueling outage.

A section of the damaged valve stem has been forwarded to the company's Operational Analysis Department for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be submitted in a supplemental report. Modifications and corrective actions which may pertain to Unit-3 will be discussed under separate cover. Valve MO 2-2301-8 is a Crane 14-inch gate valve, equipped with a Limitorque SMB-4 motor operator rated at 200 ft-lb.



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Telephone 815/942-2920

BBS Ltr. #76-822

November 26, 1976



Mr. James C. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1976-66.  
This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden  
Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson  
Station Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:jo

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
Director of Management Information & Program Control  
File/NRC

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