Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003

5 February 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-5
50-247

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Office of Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary,

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On January 23, 1974, at approximately 3:38 P.M. a slight reactor coolant system pressure transient was experienced in the course of placing a reactor coolant pump in service. The pressure transient was above the 500 psig Technical Specification limit set forth in Figure 3.1-1 for reactor coolant temperatures less than 220^0F. At the time of the occurrence the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted and a reactor coolant system temperature of about 190^0F.

In order to heat the reactor coolant system to 547^0F, preparatory to returning the plant to service following completion of repairs associated with the November 13, 1973 feedwater line break incident, the first reactor coolant pump was placed in service following prescribed procedures. These procedures entailed the establishment of a nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer to act as a surge volume for the start of the first pump. Upon starting the pump, the reactor coolant system pressure increased to above 500 psig, as indicated by readings of 525 and 510 psig on two drag pressure gages. The pressure was immediately brought down by operator action to the desired 425 psig.

The pressure transient experienced was much less than those previously reported following similar reactor coolant pump starts. The effectiveness of a gas blanket in eliminating or minimizing pressure surges when starting the first pump has thus been demonstrated. This transient of January 23, 1974 was due to an insufficient amount of nitrogen having been added to the pressurizer and

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we have changed our procedure to insure that a proper amount is inserted in the future.

There are considered to be no safety implications to this occurrence. There was no damage incurred to any system or component nor was there any reason to expect any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude. The pressure limitation of 500 psig at coolant temperatures of less than 220^0F is imposed only as a means of insuring additional conservatism in the application of fracture toughness concepts and includes the effects of fast neutron exposure which would occur over a two year period of operation. In light of the minimal amount that the limit was exceeded, and the fact that the reactor vessel has been exposed to only a small fraction of the neutron irradiation assumed, it is considered that the safety of the facility was not compromised by this occurrence.

Very truly yours,

Warren R. Cobean, Jr.
Manager - Nuclear Power
Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly