



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003



February 8, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
AEC Docket No. 50-247  
Facility Operating License  
DPR-26  
A.O.-4-2-6

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary,

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On January 25, 1974, the Indian Point Unit No. 2 reactor was brought critical in preparation for placing the plant back in service following completion of repairs associated with No. 22 steam generator feedwater line. Criticality was achieved with the "C" bank of control rods 43 steps withdrawn from the core, "B" bank 175 steps withdrawn and "D" bank fully inserted. The position of the control rods was approximately 27 steps below the insertion limit for criticality shown on Figure 3.10-1 of the Technical Specifications. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were 2235 psig and 540°F respectively. All four reactor coolant pumps were in service, and the boron concentration was 1125 ppm. Immediately upon noting that the positions of the control rods was not in conformance with Technical Specifications requirements, boron was added to the Reactor Coolant System and the rods were further withdrawn until their positions satisfied the requirements of Figure 3.10-1.

The 27-step differential represents approximately .26% reactivity. Minimum boron concentration required to maintain the stipulated shutdown margin (Figure 3.10-3 of the Technical Specifications)

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Mr. John F. O'Leary

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is calculated to be 770 ppm. Therefore, the shutdown margin existing at the time of the occurrence was three times more than that required by Figure 3.10-3.

To insure against recurrence of this incident, the importance of following operating procedures precisely has been reemphasized to all licensed Reactor Operators.

Because the operational limitations set forth in Figure 3.10-1 are derived conservatively, safe operation of Indian Point Unit No. 2 was not adversely affected by this occurrence. With the assumption that one rod is stuck in its fully withdrawn position, the boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System was still more than sufficient to shut the reactor down. The safety implications to the occurrence are therefore considered slight.

Very truly yours,

*Warren R. Cobean, Jr.*

Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager  
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly