



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003

6 February 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Facility Operating License  
DPR-26  
A.O.-4-2-7

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Regulatory Operations, Region I  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly,

On February 1, 1974 at approximately 3:50 PM both doors of the 80 foot elevation personnel air lock to the containment building were inadvertently opened at the same time for a period of about thirty seconds. At the time of this occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted in the core. The reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were 2235 psig and 540°F respectively, and the reactor coolant boric acid concentration was approximately 1190 ppm boron. With this concentration of boron and all control rods fully inserted, the reactor was subcritical by more than 7 percent  $\Delta k/k$ .

Investigation into the cause of the occurrence revealed the following pertinent information:

Whenever the plant is not in the cold shutdown condition and containment entry is to be made by other than operating personnel, a man who has been properly instructed on the operation of the air lock doors and the requirements for containment integrity is stationed in the airlock to operate its controls. In addition, signs are posted at the outside of each door to inform plant personnel when system conditions are such that containment integrity is required.

At about 3:50 PM on February 1, 1974, an offsite Company employee in attempting to enter containment from outside the air lock mistakenly operated the wrong hand wheel opening the inner air lock door. Both the operator stationed inside the air lock and the person outside realized what happened

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and both started to close the inner door. Upon closing, the inner door bounced off its seating frame and the door latch rotated into position with the inner door still open. When the individual outside the airlock noted the erroneous indication that the inner door was closed, he immediately started opening the outer door. Before the operator inside the airlock could stop its movement, and reclose the door, containment integrity had been breached for about thirty seconds.

We are continuing our investigation into this matter and will advise you of our findings and corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. Mr. Anthony Pasano of your office was notified of this occurrence on February 2, 1974 by Mr. John Makepeace.

Very truly yours,

Warren R. Cobeen

Warren R. Cobeen, Jr.  
Manager, Nuclear Power  
Generation

cc: Mr. John P. O'Leary