



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003



February 19, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
AEC Docket No. 50-247
A.O.-4-2-7

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On February 1, 1974, at approximately 3:50 P.M., both doors of the 80 foot elevation personnel air lock to the containment building were inadvertently open at the same time for a period of about thirty seconds. At time of the occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted in the core. The reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were 2235 psig and 540⁰F respectively and the reactor coolant boric acid concentration was approximately 1190 ppm boron. With this concentration of boron and all control rods fully inserted, the reactor was subcritical by more than 7 percent delta k/k.

Our investigation into the cause of the above occurrence revealed the following pertinent information:

Whenever the plant is not in the cold shutdown condition, and containment entry is to be made by other than operating personnel, a man who has been properly instructed on the operation of the air lock doors and the requirements for containment integrity is stationed in the air lock to operate its controls. In addition, signs are posted at the outside of each door to inform plant personnel when system conditions are such that containment integrity is required.

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Mr. John F. O'Leary

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
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At about 3:50 P.M. on February 1, 1974, an offsite Company employee in attempting to enter containment from outside the air lock mistakenly operated the wrong hand wheel opening the inner lock door. Both the operator stationed inside the air lock and the person outside realized what happened and both started to close the inner door. Upon closing, the inner door bounced off its seating frame and the door latch rotated into position with the inner door still open. When the individual outside the air lock noted the erroneous indication that the inner door was closed, he immediately started opening the outer door. Before the operator inside the air lock could stop its movement, and reclose the door, containment integrity had been breached for about thirty seconds.

The measures previously taken to minimize the chance of malfunction of the door interlock will continue to be followed (refer to my letter to you of September 27, 1973). In addition, we are working with Wedco and the manufacturer of the air lock to determine the cause of the interlock malfunction and necessary corrective action.

As previously indicated, at the time of the occurrence, the reactor was in a shutdown condition. While in the shutdown condition, the consequences of major accidents are significantly reduced. This fact combined with the shortness of the duration of the lack of containment integrity minimize the safety implications to this occurrence.

Very truly yours,



Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly