

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 C T M N S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 58

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 7 1 2 0 7 8 2 E 0 4 0 2 8 4 9
80 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On December 7, 1982, at 0855 hours, while performing routine rounds, fire water
0 3 storage tank A and B levels were found to be at 190,153 gallons and 190,074
0 4 gallons respectively. The tanks were immediately filled to above the Technical
0 5 Specification limit. Technical Specification 3.12.A.1.a requires two fire
0 6 suppression water supplies, each with a minimum contained volume of 200,000
0 7 gallons. There were no consequences. See attached sheet.

0 8
0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 E 12 B 13 V A L V O P 14 A 15 Z 16
17 LER NO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 0 4 9 0 1 X 1
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRC-4 FORM SUB PRIME COMP SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 Y 24 N 25 W 3 0 4 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Disassembly of 'A' make-up valve operator revealed a stripped gear. 'B' motor
1 1 operator was found to have a sticking brake. Additionally 'B' valve was
1 2 binding. The gear in 'A' make-up valve operator was rotated away from the
1 3 stripped teeth and lubricated. The sticking brake in 'B' valve operator was
1 4 removed and the valve lubricated. See attached sheet for additional corrective

7 8 9 FACILITY ACTION STATUS & POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5 E 26 1 0 0 29 NA A 31 Routine Operator Rounds
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8 0 0 0 40
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
1 9 Z 42
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 8 9 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0 N 44
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Keith Deslandes

(203) 447-1791

PHONE

NRC USE ONLY

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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April 2, 1984
MP-5918

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Reportable Occurrence RO 50-336/82-49/1X-1

Dear Dr. Murley:

This letter forwards the updated Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO 82-49/1X-1. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'E. J. Mroczka'.

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/KDD:mo

Attachment: LER RO 50-336/82-49/1X-1

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D. C. (3)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,
Washington, D. C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-49/1X-1
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 2
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-65
DOCKET NUMBER 50-336

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when fire water storage tank levels A and B were found to be below the minimum required volumes of Technical Specification.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level of 100 percent.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On December 7, 1982, at 0855 hours, while performing routine rounds, fire water storage tank A and B levels were found to be at 190, 153 gallons and 190,074 gallons respectively. The fire water storage tanks were immediately filled to above the required Technical Specification limit. Technical Specification 3.12.A.1.a requires two fire suppression water supplies, each with a minimum contained volume of 200,000 gallons.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Investigation revealed the A and B fire water make-up valve operators to be inoperative. Disassembly of 'A' make-up valve operator showed a stripped gear caused by manual operation of the valve without declutching the motor. 'B' motor operator was found to have a sticking brake. Additionally 'B' make-up valve was binding.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Operability of the fire suppression system ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The collective capability of the fire suppression system is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment.

Assuming the worst single fire event, Millstone II main transformer, a 3900 gallon per minute (gpm) water supply would be the maximum output with both fire water pumps running. This provides ample water to extinguish the fire within 20 to 30 minutes. Given a volume of 380,227 gallons (190,074 + 190,153) taking suction at 3900 gpm, a 97.5 minute supply of water would be available. When operating with the Technical Specification requirement of 200,000 gallons, a 102.56 minute supply of water would be available, a 5 minute difference. An additional 5 minute supply at that point would most likely have no significant impact on the extinguishment of the fire.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The gear in 'A' make-up valve operator was rotated away from the stripped teeth and lubricated. The sticking brake in 'B' make-up valve operator was removed and the valve lubricated.

The preventive maintenance frequency on both valves was increased in order to reduce the number of failures. Additionally, a detailed evaluation, through an engineering work request, was performed to determine the feasibility of changing the motor operators. Subsequent to this evaluation engineering concluded replacement was not feasible based on the past maintenance history of the valves and motor operators, which showed this occurrence as the only documented failure. And based on a review of the design and application of the motor operators which was found to be acceptable. The evaluation, however, did reveal the need for additional corrective measures and therefore the following action was taken:

- 1) Plates were mounted to the valves instructing the operators on the correct method of manual operation.
- 2) A surveillance procedure was initiated to require demonstrating operability of the valves once per month.
- 3) The plant equipment operators check log was modified to require checking and logging the fire water storage tank levels once per shift instead of once per day.
- 4) A design change was generated to relocate the domestic water tank level alarms away from the control room annunciator window that also shared the fire water storage tank level alarms.
- 5) The domestic water tank level alarms were relocated away from the control room annunciator window that also shared the fire water storage tank level alarms.