

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME		LICENSE NUMBER		LICENSE TYPE		EVENT TYPE	
01	I L D R S 2	00-000000-00	41111	03			
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30
CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER		EVENT DATE	
01	CON'T	L	L	050-0237	081776	091576	
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68
7		8	9	74	75	80	80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	FOLLOWING AN INSPECTION, A POST-MAINTENANCE SURVEILLANCE TEST WAS						
03	PERFORMED ON THE "A" STANDBY GAS TRAIN. THE MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE FLOW						
04	THROUGH THE TRAIN WAS 3750 CFM, WHICH IS BELOW THE TECH SPEC LIMIT OF						
05	4000 CFM. ALL VALVES IN THE FLOW LINEUP, INCLUDING FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2/-						
06	7510-A, WERE VERIFIED TO BE FULLY OPEN. PRESSURE-DROP READINGS WERE						
7	8	9	(SEE ATTACHED SHEET) 80				

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE		PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		VIOLATION	
07	S C	E	F I L T E R	A	A 2 2 0	Y					
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	THE LOW-FLOW CONDITION IN THE "A" TRAIN WAS CAUSED BY A DIRTY PRE-HEPA						
09	FILTER. THE PRE-HEPA FILTER WAS REPLACED, AND SYSTEM FLOW RETURNED TO						
10	4000 CFM. PRESSURE-DROP READINGS TAKEN ON THE "B" SBGTS TRAIN INDICATED						
7	8	9	(SEE ATTACHED SHEET) 80				

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION		
11	E	090	NA	B	NA					
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80	

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE		
12	Z	Z	NA	NA				
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
13	000	Z	NA		
7	8	9	11	12	13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
14	000	NA	
7	8	9	12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	NA				
7	8	9	80		

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
16	Z	NA	
7	8	9	10

PUBLICITY

17	NA				
7	8	9	80		

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	NA				
7	8	9	80		

19					
7	8	9	80		

8304040279 760915
PDR ADDCK 05000237
S PDR

NAME: G. L. ROMBA

PHONE: EXT. 265

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

subsequently taken across the entire train. The post-HEPA filter exhibited a pressure drop of 1.0 inches H₂O, while the pre-HEPA filter exhibited a pressure drop of 2.3 inches H₂O. The pre-HEPA filter was replaced, and the pressure drop across the new filter was reduced to 1.0 inches H₂O, restoring system flow to normal. The redundant "B" standby gas train had been demonstrated to be operable before the "A" train was removed from service for inspection. This is the first reported failure of this nature on the standby gas treatment system. (50-237/1976-55)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)

that the pre-HEPA filter on that train was also becoming clogged with dirt; however, total flow remained above Tech Spec limits. The "B" train pre-HEPA filter was replaced.

To prevent recurrence, the surveillance procedure for testing SBT system filters has been revised to include typical clean-filter pressure-drop values. This will facilitate identification and replacement of system filters which are approaching the limit of serviceability.



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

BBS Ltr. #76-679

September 15, 1976

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137



REFERENCE: Docket Number 50-237
Docket Number 50-249

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1976-55.
This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden
Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:jo

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

9566

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