Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960 • 539-6111

August 11, 1972

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket 50-219
Containment Spray Pump Failure

The purpose of this letter is to report to you that Containment Spray Pump 51 C could not be started from the Control Room on August 1, 1972 when an attempt was made to recirculate water in the Suppression Chamber for the purpose of obtaining a sample for chemical analysis.

Troubleshooting of the pump supply breaker closing circuit was conducted and although the breaker was visually checked to be properly racked in, a loss of continuity was discovered to exist across the breaker position switch which is closed when the breaker is racked in and ready for service. The breaker was racked out, the switch inspected and cleaned, and the breaker was racked back into normal position. Continuity checks indicated the switch to be closed. However, when a starting signal was applied, the breaker failed to close. The start-stop switch and the keylock switch were operated and observed without potential several times. Control voltage was applied and the breaker closed at this time, the pump started and an operability check was satisfactorily completed.

The start-stop switch and the keylock switch were inspected and found to be in good condition. Resistance checks were made across the breaker position switch contact and measured to be .09 ohms. The breaker was racked out, the switch contacts cleaned and burnished, and after racking the breaker back in, contact resistance was measured to be .0019 ohms. All wiring was checked and no loose leads found.

There was no safety significance associated with this event since, as stated in the FDSAR, Volume I, Section VI 7-1 and Amendment 32, only one Containment Spray Loop is necessary to remove the energy postulated from the loss of coolant accident. The second Containment Spray Loop in this case, Loop I, would have been capable of performing this function since the primary pump in that loop was started and found

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operable. In addition, the Control Room Operator could have started the backup pump in Loop II during the postulated accident. Operability of that pump was checked when it was run to permit taking a water sample.

In the future, all 460-volt safeguard system breaker control devices will be checked during annual refueling outages. In addition, an immediate inspection is being made of all 460-volt safeguard system breakers.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

IRF/pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations