

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 539-6111

August 22, 1972

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Inoperability of Isolation Condensers

The purpose of this letter is to advise you of a failure of the isolation condenser system to function properly during a recent plant cooldown.

On August 9, 1972, a plant cooldown was in progress when, at approximately 140 psig and 360°F, the main steam isolation valves were closed and an attempt was made to place the "A" isolation condenser in service. The condensate return valve opened but the "A" isolation condenser rupture alarm was annunciated and the condenser was automatically isolated. Then, when an attempt was made to place the "B" isolation condenser in service, the condensate return valve, V-14-35, would not open.

Investigation of the incident revealed that the needle on the differential pressure gage for condensate line break sensor 1B11 A1 for the "A" isolation condenser was caught on the indicator over-travel stop, apparently having ranged upscale upon initiation of the condensers. The full scale deflection was due to the fact that a snubber, which had been removed from the high side sensing line for sensors 1B11 A1 and A2 to permit flow testing of the associated excess flow check valve, had not been replaced. Had the needle not caught on the stop, the sensor would have responded, as did its counterpart, 1B11 A2, and the isolation would not have occurred. The problem with the "B" isolation condenser condensate return valve, V-14-35, was that the valve was closed too tightly on its seat which caused the breaker to trip on overload when the valve was called upon to open.

The glass front cover was removed from sensor 1B11 A1, and the needle removed from the pointer over-travel stop. When the needle moved downscale, the "rupture alarm" reset. A calibration check was then performed on both condensate line break sensors for the "A" isolation condenser and the condenser returned to service. The

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breaker for the "B" isolation condenser was checked and no abnormality was found. The setting of the breaker overloads was checked and found to be proper. The valve was operated and the various torque and limit switches were found to function properly.

At the time of this incident, the station was being shut down; thus, the action taken was consistent with Technical Specification requirements. The following actions are being taken to assure against a recurrence of this event:

1. The snubbers from the instrument header sensing lines are being relocated to the individual sensing line connection for each differential pressure instrument. This modification will then permit flow testing of the associated excess flow check valves free from the effects of any snubber.
2. A test at operating temperature and pressure has been conducted to determine that the magnitude and duration of the differential pressure transient sensed by the differential pressure instrumentation upon initiation of the isolation condenser will not inadvertently trip the system.
3. Isolation condenser valve operability tests, normally conducted at monthly intervals, are being conducted weekly during the next month to gain reassurance that the isolation condenser will function when required.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours,



Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

IRF/pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1