

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME: 01 I L D R S 2 14

LICENSE NUMBER: 00 - 00 00 00 - 00 25

LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 30

EVENT TYPE: 0 1 32

CATEGORY: 01 CON'T 57 58

REPORT TYPE: T 59

REPORT SOURCE: L 60

DOCKET NUMBER: 05 0 - 02 3 7 68

EVENT DATE: 09 0 2 7 6 69

REPORT DATE: 09 1 5 7 6 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 7 8 9 REVIEW OF A QUAD-CITIES STATION UNUSUAL EVENT LETTER LED TO THE

03 7 8 9 DISCOVERY THAT DRESDEN'S UNIT 2/3 STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM DE-

04 7 8 9 VIATED FROM THE "SINGLE FAILURE" CRITERIA. THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION

05 7 8 9 GIVES THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CAN LEAD TO A SINGLE FAILURE THAT

06 7 8 9 DISABLES THE SBTG SYSTEM. (SEE ATTACHED SHEET)

SYSTEM CODE: 07 S C 10

CAUSE CODE: B 11

COMPONENT CODE: X X X X X X 17

PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: A 43

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 47

VIOLATION: Y 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 7 8 9 THIS DEVIATION FROM THE "SINGLE FAILURE" CRITERIA WAS THE RESULT OF A DE-

09 7 8 9 FICIENCY IN THE ORIGINAL LOGIC DESIGN. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

10 7 8 9 WAS TO TAKE INLET VALVES 2-7603 AND 3-7603 OUT OF SERVICE IN THE OPEN

(SEE ATTACHED SHEET) 80

FACILITY STATUS: 11 E 9

% POWER: 09 7 12

OTHER STATUS: NA 13

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D 44

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: NA 46

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: 12 Z 9

CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z 10

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 11

LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER: 13 000 11

TYPE: Z 12

DESCRIPTION: NA 13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER: 14 000 11

DESCRIPTION: NA 12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 7 8 9 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE: 16 Z 10

DESCRIPTION: NA 11

PUBLICITY

17 7 8 9 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 7 8 9 NA

8303300769 760915
PDR ADOCK 05000237
S PDR

19 7 8 9

NAME: G. L. ROMBA

PHONE: EXT. 265

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

1. One of the two units produces a SBT system auto-initiation signal. As the system logic is designed presently, this auto-initiation signal closes the SBT system inlet valve from the second unit.
2. The initiation signal is removed, and the SBT system is reset; however, the inlet valve from the other unit remains closed.
3. The operator does not recognize that the inlet valve has failed to open, and no corrective action is initiated.
4. At this time, the second unit produces a SBT system auto-initiation signal. This signal closes the SBT system inlet valve from the first unit.
5. Both SBT system inlet valves are now closed, and the SBT system is disabled.

Under these circumstances, therefore, a single failure could render the SBT system inoperable. (50-237/1976-59)

CAUSED DESCRIPTION (Continued)

position. Since the reactor buildings for Units 2 and 3 are common, suction can be taken from either unit for effective reactor building atmosphere processing.

To prevent recurrence, a modification request has been initiated for forwarding to the Station Nuclear Engineering Department. The resultant modification will include a system logic revision to preclude the possibility of the described failure rendering the SBT system inoperable. The SBTs inlet valves for both units will remain in the open position until this modification is satisfactorily implemented.



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D. L. HANNAH

BBS Ltr. #76-680

September 15, 1976



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

REFERENCE: Docket Number 50-237
Docket Number 50-249

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1976-59.
This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden
Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson
B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:jo

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

SEP 20 1976

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