

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST
SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202

November 21, 1973

Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for Reactor Operations
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Re: Provisional Operating License: DPR-17
Docket No.: 50-220

Dear Mr. Skovholt:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station #1 (NMPNS) in which on November 17, 1973 at 1626 hours a loss of incoming 115 KV occurred.

Technical Specification 3.6.3.a states:

Specification:

- a. For all reactor operating conditions except cold shutdown, there shall normally be available two 115 KV external lines, two diesel-generator power systems and two battery systems.....

On November 17, 1973 the reactor was scheduled for AEC Operator Examination involving a critical demonstration. After the reactor was shutdown in the early morning (~2 a.m.) breaker R40 was opened to facilitate line work on the 115 KV line between James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP) and NMPNS #1. Breaker R10, the remaining 115 KV line breaker was closed and the station was operating on reserve power supplied by this line. Following the Reactor Operator critical demonstrations, the reactor was in the just critical condition, moderator temperature 207°F, mode switch in start-up and the JAFNPP-NMPNS 115 KV line out of service. A plant electrician, working with the relay department in the auxiliary control room on the JAFNPP-NMPNS 115 KV line relay accidentally bumped a relay (50 FDS/SI) causing Relay 945 to de-energize thus tripping the remaining 115 KV line. The plant remained without off-site power for 10 seconds until breaker R10 reclosed.

A reactor scram occurred within seconds (5.4) as M.G. Sets #131 and #141 (which supplies power to the scram pilot solenoids) upon loss of A.C. power, tripped at 55 hz. Within the allowable 10 seconds both diesel generator systems had started and energized the two control rod drive pumps to maintain reactor water within the normal expected range for this transient. As water level remained normal no other safeguard equipment was needed.

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PDR

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
Restoration of normal reserve station power occurred within 10 seconds and upon resetting necessary plant feeders normal reserve A.C. was established to plant equipment and the diesel generators shutdown.

The reactor was restarted at approximately 2100 hours with both 115 KV lines in service and normal plant conditions.

All systems performed their designed function as required and no hazard was presented to the general public.

To prevent a reoccurrence of this incident the plant electricians were made aware of the need to be extra cautious when working around relaying in particular when one line is already de-energized.

Very truly yours,



Rudolph R. Schneider

Vice President - Electric Operations

RRS:cm