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SNUPPS

Standardized Nuclear Unit
Power Plant System

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April 13, 1984

SLNRC 84- 0067 FILE: 0491.10.2
SUBJ: Supplemental Report: Gould/Rundel
Selector Switch Failures,
10CFR50.55(e) Report 84-01

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Docket Nos. STN 50-482 and STN 50-483

Ref: SLNRC 84-0028, dated 2/9/84: Subject as above.

Gentlemen:

The reference letter forwarded to NRC a report concerning a generic design deficiency in Gould/Rundel four-position selector switches furnished to the SNUPPS Callaway and Wolf Creek plants. The selector switches described in the subject report had exhibited erratic behavior such as binding, inconsistent continuity, and intermittent switch positioning due to sequential actuation of contact blocks. The resolution of the reported deficiency consisted of replacing all eight (8) Gould/Rundel, four-position selector switches in each plant with switches of modified design. The modified switches contained a common steel shaft for simultaneous actuation of all the cams and contacts.

The purpose of this supplemental report is to inform NRC of the failure of two (2) of eight (8) replacement switches shipped to Callaway site. This deficiency was reported by Union Electric to NRC Region III on March 16, 1984. Both units failed during preoperational testing at that site. Contacts 5-6 failed to close in one switch and several contacts showed intermittent problems including contacts not closing due to overtravel in the other. The two (2) failed switches were returned to Gould, Inc., Industrial Controls Division, Westminster, Maryland, for analysis. The failure of the first switch was attributed to improper handling during testing. Gould was able to simulate this type of failure by blocking the movement of contact plungers while operating the switch. The failure

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of the second switch was attributed to ineffective quality control and checkout testing practices employed during fabrication. This was confirmed by diagnostic examination which revealed an improperly cut cam.

To preclude future failures caused by improper handling during testing, Gould will supply a caution flyer with all future selector switch shipments warning against any blockage which might prevent movement of the contact plungers. In addition, each switch will be supplied with a quality control sheet indicating complete and satisfactory checkout testing. Each new four-position selector switch will be serialized to assure full traceability back through shop fabrication records. The failed Callaway switches will be replaced prior to fuel load.

Please do not hesitate to call should there be any questions concerning this supplemental report.

Very truly yours,


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SJS/dckW13b25

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