TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

April 13, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Ms. E. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority )

Please refer to my letters to you dated November 14, 1983, and March 23 and April 3, 1984 which requested an exemption for the Sequoyah unit 1 schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(g). Your subsequent approval of the exemption was granted on April 11, 1984 via your letter to H. G. Parris.

TVA has identified an additional 12 components which we have been unable to complete during the unit 1, cycle 2 refueling outage. Enclosed is a listing of these components. These components have been previously identified in TVA's May 20, 1983 final rule submittal (D. S. Kammer to you) and justification for continued operation (JCOs) have been provided to you by previous Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report (EEEQR) submittals. The JCOs provided are still applicable.

We are therefore requesting an extension for the remaining 12 components to the unit 1, cycle 3 outage which is now scheduled for June through September of 1985.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with K. P. Parr at FTS 858-2685.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 13th day of April 1984

Paulette A. White
Notary Public
My Commission Expires 9-5-84

Enclosure
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure)
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

A048
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ENCLOSURE

NCR CB 8152

The six components listed below are used as containment isolation valves. It was determined that certain environmental conditions could exist that might cause a failure of the limit switches associated with the valves listed below. The failure of the limit switches might permit the valves to reopen when a containment isolation signal is reset; therefore, a design change to install a seal-in circuit independent of the limit switch position was required to prevent an inadvertent opening of these containment isolation valves. The necessary drawings to perform this modification were not completed and issued until March 1984. This did not allow sufficient time for proper planning and scheduling of this modification during the cycle 2 refueling outage. This modification will require extensive wiring changes (i.e., cable pulling, terminations, etc.), but can be completed during the non-outage period following this refueling outage; therefore, this modification will be scheduled to be completed before March 31, 1985, but no later than the next refueling outage. The following components are affected.

FCV-62-72, 73, 74
FCV-77-16
FCV-87-7, 8

NCR EEB 8037

The six pressure switches listed below are located on the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's suction header and are designed to initiate a automatic switchover from the normal condensate storage tank water supply to the essential raw cooling water system in the event of a low supply header pressure from the condensate storage tank. To meet the postulated environmental conditions at the pressure switches, it was determined that the presently installed pressure switches could not be qualified and new pressure switches would be required. The new switches were procured and delivered to the site. Subsequently, these items were non-conformed at the site because of inadequate vendor documentation. Attempts to correct this inadequacy within a timeframe to support the cycle 2 outage were unsuccessful. This modification will be scheduled for completion before March 31, 1985, but no later than the next refueling outage. The following components are affected.

PS-3-139 A, B, D
PS-3-144 A, B, D