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May 18, 1995
ND3MNO:3679

***Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, Licensee No. DPR-66
LER-95-005-00***

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 95-005-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i.B, "Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry Due to Isolation of Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System".

L. R. Freeland
General Manager
Nuclear Operations

JGT/clp

Attachment

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cc. Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000334

PAGE (3)

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Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry Due to Isolation of Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	20	95	95	-- 005 --	00	05	18	95	Beaver Valley U 2	05000412
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 20 CFR § (Check one or more) (11)							
1			20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
100			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in abstract below and in Text	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		NRC Form 366A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

L. R. Freeland, General Manager Nuclear Operations

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

(412) 643-1258

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS				COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	VI	XXXX	XXXX	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limited to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 20, 1995 at 1528 hours, with Unit 1 in Power Operation at 100% power and Unit 2 in Refueling, a spurious Train "A" Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) actuation was generated during the performance of an Operating Surveillance Test (OST). The OST tests one of the two Unit 1 control room radiation monitors. The actuation occurred at 1528 hours, when operators transferred the CREBAPS circuitry power supply from the Unit 2 source to the Unit 1 source. The transfer was conducted in accordance with the procedure in use. No immediate cause for the actuation was identified. After confirming that the actuation signal was invalid at 1529 hours, Operations personnel isolated the CREBAPS air bottles, which had begun discharging into the common control room envelope. Isolation of the CREBAPS air bottles intentionally entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for BVPS Unit 1. After resetting the spurious Train "A" actuation signal, the CREBAPS air bottles were unisolated and returned to normal system arrangement. The station exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1544 hours. The spurious actuation signal could not be duplicated during subsequent testing. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B, as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1	05000334	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		95	005	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366a) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 20, 1995 at 1528 hours, with Unit 1 in Power Operation (Mode 1) at 100% power and Unit 2 in Refueling (Mode 6), a spurious Train "A" Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) actuation was generated during the performance of an Operating Surveillance Test (OST). The OST tests one of the two Unit 1 control room radiation monitors. The actuation occurred at 1528 hours, when operators transferred the CREBAPS circuitry power supply from the Unit 2 source to the Unit 1 source. The transfer was conducted in accordance with the procedures in use. No immediate cause for the actuation was identified. After verifying that no valid Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System actuation signals existed, an operator was dispatched at 1529 hours, to isolate the air bottles in accordance with operating procedure 1/2OM-44A.4AA, "Post Control Room Habitability System Actuation/Recovery". Isolation of the CREBAPS air bottles intentionally entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for BVPS Unit 1. After resetting the spurious Train "A" actuation signal, the CREBAPS air bottles were unisolated and returned to normal system arrangement. The station exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1544 hours. The spurious actuation signal could not be duplicated during subsequent testing.

CAUSE OF EVENT

An investigation was conducted by Instrument and Control, Engineering, and Operations personnel. The cause of this event was a spurious actuation signal resulting from electrical noise spiking on either the Train "A" Control Room Radiation Monitor, RM-RM-218A, or the Train "A" Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, RM-RM-219A. The Containment High Range Radiation Monitors and the Control Room Radiation Monitors are located in the same cabinet and this close proximity makes them susceptible to electrical noise generated within either monitor during power supply or switching transients. The specific component causing the electrical noise spiking could not be identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The following corrective actions have been taken or are planned as a result of this event:

1. The station is pursuing corrective actions to eliminate the noise interference that is occurring between the radiation monitors. Electrical noise interference specialists have been consulted to assist in implementing an effective solution.
2. Procedural revisions have been instituted to isolate the CREBAPS headers during Control Room Radiation Monitor testing. Technical Specifications allow the CREBAPS system to be isolated for up to eight (8) hours for the performance of instrumentation and control system testing. Recharging the CREBAPS bottles is a slow process and isolating the headers during tests that have the potential to inadvertently discharge the bottles will ensure the bottles remain fully pressurized and readily available for realignment during valid discharge demands.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.01^{hrs}. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNRB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1		05000334		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
				95	005	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

REPORTABILITY

Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. is considered a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, therefore this written report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety implications due to this event. The Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System functioned as designed upon receipt of an actuation signal. Since the air bottles were isolated in a timely manner, the air bottle subsystem pressure remained above the 1825 psig limit required by Technical Specification 3.7.7.1. The subsystem was inoperable solely because it was manually isolated for 15 minutes, during which it could have been returned to service if a valid need arose, as an operator was stationed at the air bottles for this purpose.

SIMILAR EVENTS

The following similar events have been previously reported regarding the isolation of the CREBAPS air bottles and entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3:

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1:

LER 1-93-003 on November 3, 1993 - which involved a spurious signal on a radiation monitor while manipulating the monitor's control switch during testing.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2:

LER 2-95-001 on February 14, 1995 - which involved a spurious signal on a radiation monitor during the reconnection of the power connector.

LER 2-95-002 on March 11, 1995 - which involved a CREBAPS actuation caused by accidental alligator clip contact with an adjacent terminal while installing an electrical jumper for testing.