

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 P A T M I 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 8 9 7 1 2 2 2 8 2 8 0 1 2 1 8 3 9  
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While in long term cold shutdown, plant personnel identified fire barrier  
0 3 penetration seal 489 as having an unacceptable void under a cable tray support  
0 4 angle. Public health and safety remain unaffected. Reportable per Tech. Spec.  
0 5 6.9.2.B(2), as a result of violating Tech. Spec. 4.18.7 which does not permit  
0 6 operation in a degraded mode, without filing an LER.  
0 7

0 8

0 9  
7 8 9  
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
A B 11 B 12 C 13 Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
8 2 0 1 6 0 3 L 0  
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
E 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z Z Z Z 26  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A fire watch was posted within 1 hour. Repairs were completed 12/23/82. Only  
1 1 temporary damming material is now used to allow for inspections on both sides of  
1 2 seal. It is recommended that plants using silicone foam seals with permanent  
1 3 damming be made aware of the potential for voids.  
1 4

1 5

FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
1 5 X 28 0 0 0 29 NRC Order B 31 QC Personnel  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
1 6 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
1 8 0 0 0 40 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)  
1 9 Z 42 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
2 0 Z 44 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

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PDR ADOCT 05000289  
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER C. J. Stephenson

PHONE (717) 948-8554

I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE

TMI-1 was in a long-term shutdown condition. The condition was identified by Quality Control personnel performing a restart modification acceptance package walkdown.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO OCCURRENCE

QC was inspecting seal 489 for repairs following a wire pull required by a plant modification. The wire pull involved the removal of the permanent damming material (M-Board or Ceraboard) used to form the Relay Room face of the seal. The removal of the damming material exposed a void space in the seal under tray 249.

III. DESCRIPTION

Seal 489 is a 32 inch by 50 inch penetration in the west wall of the Relay Room at about the 347' elevation. The penetration has 4 trays and several conduits passing through it. The tray support for tray 249 is a large angle iron across the face of the penetration. When seal 489 was initially poured in the fall of 1977, the angle iron was not removed and because of the configuration of the trays, a void in the seal resulted behind the angle iron under tray 249.

The condition was identified by QC personnel on 12/22/82 and was immediately examined by the Shift Supervisor and the Lead Fire Protection Engineer. A determination was made that the seal did not meet the functional requirements of T.S. 3.18.7.1, and a fire watch was established per T.S. 3.18.7.2. This is considered reportable under T.S. 6.9.2.B.2 since T.S. 3.18.7 requires seals to be functional at all times with no operation allowed in a degraded mode without a report.

IV. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AS A RESULT OF OCCURRENCE

None.

V. PREVIOUS EVENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE

The occurrence of voids in vertical wall seals using silicone foam has been identified as a problem in the sealing industry in general, with one other non-reportable instance identified in TMI-1 previously.

VI. ROOT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Erratic expansion of foam around penetrating items. The 1977 installation procedures used by the seal installer did not require the removal of damming material on both faces for a complete seal inspection. The TMI-1 Seal Installer has changed their procedures to use only temporary damming material for inspections on both sides of seals.

VII. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

A fire watch was posted within 1 hour. A material non-conformance report was written and a priority 1 job ticket was issued for temporary repairs which were completed on 12/23/82.

VIII. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

A job ticket requiring vendor assistance was written for permanent seal repairs.

There are a few other TMI-1 wall seals with permanent damming left in place. Relay Room and BOP seals will be inspected prior to heatup to ensure no other similar voids exist. No procedure or specification changes are necessary.

The Lead Fire Protection Engineer will advise the TMI-1 Seal Installer and American Nuclear Insurers of the identified problem; as noted above, this Seal Installer has corrected their procedures to allow for the detection of voids. It is recommended that other plants using silicone foam seals with permanent damming be made aware of the potential for voids.