TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 27, 1983

BLRD-50-438/82-33
BLRD-50-439/82-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82-30 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on April 22, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8203. This was followed by our interim report dated May 24, 1982. Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report by May 18, 1983. An extension on the submittal of this report was granted by NRC-OIE Inspector Paul Fredrickson on December 28, 1982.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING
BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
NCR BLN NEB 8203
BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82-30
10 CFR 50.55(e)
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A pipe failure of the nonsafety grade Steam Generator Startup and Recirculation System in the Auxiliary Building could result in a harsh environment that exceeds the qualification limits for safety-related electrical equipment. Failure of nearby safety-related equipment in one system train because of the harsh environment caused by the pipe break coupled with an assumed failure in the same safety system in the other train may result in a situation that could adversely affect safe shutdown of the plant.

The cause of this deficiency was determined to be lack of sufficient pipe break analysis criteria at the time of system design. No other TVA facilities are affected by this deficiency.

Interim Progress

Engineering change notice 1579 has been written and approved to relocate and/or enclose by guard piping or pipe chase the steam generator startup and recirculation piping in the auxiliary building trained areas. This work has been scheduled and is in the process of being implemented.