

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 27, 1983

BLRD-50-438/82-33  
BLRD-50-439/82-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL  
QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL  
FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - BLRD-50-438/82-33,  
BLRD-50-439/82-30 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
R. V. Crlenjak on April 22, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR BLN NEB 8203. This was followed by our interim report dated May 24,  
1982. Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our  
next report by May 18, 1983. An extension on the submittal of this  
report was granted by NRC-OIE Inspector Paul Fredrickson on December 28,  
1982.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch  
with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

PELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING  
BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM  
NCR BLN NEB 8203  
BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82-30  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A pipe failure of the nonsafety grade Steam Generator Startup and Recirculation System in the Auxiliary Building could result in a harsh environment that exceeds the qualification limits for safety-related electrical equipment. Failure of nearby safety-related equipment in one system train because of the harsh environment caused by the pipe break coupled with an assumed failure in the same safety system in the other train may result in a situation that could adversely affect safe shutdown of the plant.

The cause of this deficiency was determined to be lack of sufficient pipe break analysis criteria at the time of system design. No other TVA facilities are affected by this deficiency.

Interim Progress

Engineering change notice 1579 has been written and approved to relocate and/or enclose by guard piping or pipe chase the steam generator startup and recirculation piping in the auxiliary building trained areas. This work has been scheduled and is in the process of being implemented.