TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 28, 1983

BLRD-50-438/83-10
BLRD-50-439/83-07

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - POWER FOR EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP UNITS AFTER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER - BLRD-50-438/83-10, BLRD-50-439/83-07- FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN BLP 8235. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about October 21, 1983.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

IE 27

ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
POWER FOR EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP UNITS
AFTER LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
BLRD-50-438/83-10, BLRD-50-439/83-07
10 CFR 50.55(e)
NCR BLN BLP 8235
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The emergency air cleanup units limit the airborne contamination in the main control room to acceptable levels and the units are started either automatically or manually during control room isolation. The Control Building Environmental Control System Design Criteria (N4-VK-D740) requires that all redundant safety-related components be automatically loaded as part of the accident loading sequence and the loss of power loading sequence. However, a recent drawing review initiated in response to NCR BLN QAB 8101 has disclosed that, due to a design error, the present solid-state control system's (SSCS) controls will not allow the unit to be automatically loaded as part of the loss of power loading sequence in the event the unit had been operating prior to loss of offsite power.

Safety Implications

Loss of the emergency air cleanup units during the presence of airborne contaminants or excessive temperatures could cause the loss of control room habitability which could effect safe operation of the plant.

Interim Progress

TVA Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 1690 has been initiated to correct the control logic so that the cleanup units will be automatically loaded as part of the loss of power loading sequence.