

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM

### CAUSE

CAUSE  
SUBCODE

COMPONENT CODE

COMP.  
SUBCODEVALVE  
EQUIPMENT

17 LER/HO  
REPORT  
NUMBER

EVENT YEAR

SEQUENTIAL  
REPORT NO.

OCCURRENCE  
CODE

REPORT  
TYPE

REVISION  
NO.

ACTION  
TAKEN

FUTURE  
ACTION

EFFECT  
ON PLANTSHUTDOWN  
METHOD

HOURS (

ATTACHMEN  
SUBMITTED

NPRO-4  
FORM SUB

PRIME COMPANY  
SUPPLIER

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (2)

FACILITY

POWER

OTHER STATUS

#### METHOD OF DISCOVERY

#### DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

DESCRIPTION (37)

NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES	
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
1	...
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3	...
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100	...

PTION (41)

NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY	
TYPE	DESCRIPTION

43

NA

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

8302030527 830128  
PDR ADCK 05000296  
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Bobby J. Irby

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 8268 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.1 \* Date Due NRC 1/29/83

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were operating normally at 99-percent power and 100-percent power, respectively. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Only unit 3 was affected by this event. During the performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.B-69 (Reactor High Pressure), pressure switch, PS-3-204C, had an as-found setpoint of 1125.9 psig. Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.2.B required trip setting is equal to or less than 1120 psig. Pressure above the setpoint trips recirculation pump "A".

Pressure switch PS-3-204C calibration had drifted. The static-O-ring model 9N-AA45-X9-TT pressure switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public. A redundant switch was available and operable. (See attached action plan for corrective action, category 3).

\* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/81048,  
260/78023, 80030  
296/82055

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP

ACTION PLAN  
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM  
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS  
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.