

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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January 28, 1983
MP-4629

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Reportable Occurrence RO 50-336/82-52/3L-0

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 82-52/3L-0 required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to Millstone Unit 2 Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'E. J. Mroczka'.

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TF:mo

Attachment: LER RO 50-336/82-52/3L-0

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D. C. (3)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,
Washington, D. C. 20555

ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-52/3L-0
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 2
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NUMBER DPR-65
DOCKET NUMBER 50-336

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Two separate and independent HPSI pumps were not operable as required by the Technical Specifications 3.5.2.a.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The unit was in a routine startup mode prior to the event occurrence.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On December 31, 1982 at 0940 hours, a leak was discovered on the discharge of the C Service Water pump. The C Service Water pump was tagged out of operation. To maintain two operable service water pumps on separate emergency facilities, the swing bus powering the B Service Water and HPSI pumps was lined up to the Facility II emergency bus. This electrical line up caused the only two operable HPSI pumps (B & C) to be powered from the same emergency facility (Facility II). Therefore the A HPSI pump was aligned to the Facility I bus and the B HPSI pump breaker was racked-out.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Subsequent to the overhaul of the A HPSI pump, a flow test to prove operability was required. This test must be done during a refueling outage. Therefore the swing facility HPSI pump was aligned to Facility I. Due to the leak on the C Service Water pump, the swing facility Service Water pump was required for operation. Rather than maintain both operable Service Water pumps powered from the same facility, the swing bus was aligned to Facility II. The A HPSI pump was aligned to Facility I so that two HPSI pumps would be available, though only one had satisfied all of its Tech. Spec. surveillances. TSAS 3.5.2.a was entered during the Service Water repair.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

It was deemed more conservative to power the operable Service Water pumps from separate facilities. There exists a high degree of confidence that the available HPSI would satisfy all emergency requirements, therefore no adverse effects would result from this operating condition.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The C Service Water pump was repaired and returned to service. The swing bus was returned to being fed from the Facility I emergency bus. This allowed the plant to return to two separate and independent HPSI and Service Water pumps.