



Nebraska Public Power District

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May 16, 1995

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Special Report Pursuant to Technical Specification 3.15.C.2
Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46

Gentlemen:

On May 15, 1995, a loss of switchyard 12.5 KV power resulted in temporary inoperability of the Fire Suppression Water (FSW) System. Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specification 3.15.C.2 requires the submittal of a Special Report within one working day whenever the FSW System is inoperable. The report is to discuss the cause of the inoperability, action taken, and plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

Cause of the Inoperability

Flow for the CNS FSW System is provided by one electric-driven pump (FP-P-E) and one diesel-driven pump (FP-P-D). An additional electric pump (FP-P-C) is available as an installed backup. The Fire Water Pumps auto-start on low fire water header pressure. An electric jockey pump maintains the header pressurized to prevent inadvertent pump starts.

On May 15, 1995, at 1510 a phase-to-phase short circuit on a 12.5 KV power line occurred due to a failed shield wire. Initially, the extent of the fault in the 12.5 KV System was not known and Abnormal Procedure 2.4.6.14, "Loss of 12.5 KV Power" was entered. This procedure required the primary electric fire water pump and the diesel-driven fire water pump to be rendered inoperable by placing their control switches in the pull-to-lock position (thereby defeating the auto-start feature). This procedural step is required to prevent pump damage due to erroneous pump starts resulting from system pressure decay (the jockey pump loses power in this transient). This configuration left FP-P-D and FP-P-E available for manual initiation. The backup electric pump (which was unaffected by the transient) was available for providing alternate FSW System capability.

Action Taken

Shortly after the Abnormal Procedure was entered, investigations determined that the plant experienced only a partial loss of 12.5 KV System power which did not, in fact, impact the Fire Water Pumps. Accordingly, the pumps were restored to their normal switch configurations and returned to operability at 1522 that day. The NRC was informed of this event by telephone within 24 hours of occurrence, as specified in the CNS Technical Specifications.

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Plans and Schedule for Restoring System to Operability

As discussed in the previous paragraph, the Fire Suppression Water System has been restored to operability. Owing to the short period of system inoperability, the availability of the primary electric and diesel-driven fire pumps for manual actuation, and the availability of the backup electric fire pump, the safety significance of this event was low.

Sincerely,



P. J. Di Rito
Operations Manager

/nr

cc: L. J. Callan
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R. A. Sessoms
K. C. Walden
INPO Records
NRC Resident Inspector
R. J. Singer
CNS Training
CNS Quality Assurance

The following table identifies those actions committed to by the District in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

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