

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

January 21, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 82-064

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-064 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement C of Technical Specification 3.6.4 "Containment Isolation Valves" and Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 "Containment Integrity" on December 23, 1982.

If you have any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

HCF:OWD:dwf  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer  
T. C. Nichols, Jr.  
E. C. Roberts  
O. W. Dixon, Jr.  
H. N. Cyrus  
H. T. Babb  
D. A. Nauman  
M. B. Whitaker, Jr.  
W. A. Williams, Jr.  
O. S. Bradham  
R. B. Clary  
M. N. Browne

A. R. Koon  
G. D. Moffatt  
Site QA  
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#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 23, 1982 at 1400 hours with the Plant in Mode 1, Nuclear Sampling System Valves 9398A (B) failed to close within the required isolation time identified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.3. Containment integrity was re-established at 1451 hours, upon the closure of the associated manual valves, in compliance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1.

#### PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

There were no adverse consequences from this event. The closure of the associated manual valves insured that the possible loss of containment integrity could not occur.

#### CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to crud buildup on the valve seats which inhibited the normal stroke of the automatic valves.

#### IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

The manual isolation valves for 9398A (B) were closed within one (1) hour in order to insure that containment integrity was maintained. Investigation performed on December 23, 1982 indicated that mechanical binding was causing the slow closure of the automatic valves (3 - 5 minutes). Upon this determination the valves were left shut and scheduled for repair during the next plant outage.

Temporary relief from Technical Specification 3.0.4 was requested and granted in regard to mode escalation with the inoperable valves on December 28, 1982 after the plant experienced a reactor trip. However, prior to reactor criticality the valves were returned to an operable condition by exercising the valves concurrent with tapping on the valve body. Crud buildup in the valve body was dislodged and the valves were declared operable at 1700 hours on December 28, 1982, upon the satisfactory performance of surveillance testing.

#### ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The crud accumulation present in the sample lines was apparently the result of the 20 to 30 PPM of suspended solids observed in the Steam Generators during initial power escalation. The concentration has since been reduced by a significant amount. The licensee plans no additional action in regard to this event unless warranted by a similar occurrence in the future.