

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 9 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Spurious Start of Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	3	1	8	8	4	0	1	7	0	0	0
0	3	1	8	8	4	0	0	0	4	1	1
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
4			20.402(b)								
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)								
0			20.405(a)(1)(ii)								
0			20.405(a)(1)(iii)								
0			20.405(a)(1)(iv)								
0			20.405(a)(1)(v)								
			20.405(c)								
			50.36(c)(1)								
			50.36(c)(2)								
			50.73(a)(2)(i)								
			50.73(a)(2)(ii)								
			50.73(a)(2)(iii)								
			50.73(a)(2)(iv)								
			50.73(a)(2)(v)								
			50.73(a)(2)(vi)								
			50.73(a)(2)(vii)								
			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
			50.73(a)(2)(ix)								
			73.71(b)								
			73.71(c)								
			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
			50.72(b)(2)(ii)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
L. D. Kassakatis, Plant Compliance EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 5 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 4727

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS
A	V	H		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO ☐EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Due to a personnel error, the Control Room Emergency Filtration Fan (Div. II) initiated while running surveillance procedure testing (Secondary Containment Isol. Reactor Building Vent Radiation - Channel Functional Test). A procedure deviation and LER 84-018 had been written on the same problem. However, when the subsequent surveillance procedure was run, the deviated procedure was not used and the event occurred again. The procedure deviation tracking system was examined to insure there were no revisions required.

The procedure has now been revised and subsequent surveillances run successfully with no inadvertent actuations.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2	05000397	84	0117	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Operating Conditions Prior to Event:

Power Level - Zero
Mode Switch Position - Shutdown
Mode - Cold Shutdown (Mode 4)
Prior to Initial Power Operation

Event:

Surveillance Procedure PPM 7.4.3.2.1.15 (Secondary Containment Isol. Reactor Building Vent Radiation - Channel Functional Test) tests only one sub-channel at a time of the "Z" signal. Performing one sub-channel at a time prevents an FAZ trip.

After FAZ relays 3AX, 3AY, 3BX, or 3BY are tripped, push button WMA-RMS-FAZ/3AXY (Div. I) or 3BXY (Div. II) must be depressed to reset the respective relay. This step was not written into Procedure PPM 7.4.3.2.1.15. Consequently, "B" sub-channel was not reset before testing of the "D" sub-channel, causing an FAZ signal from Relays 3BX and 3BY, and the subsequent starting of Control Room Emergency Fans WMA-FN-54B, along with the shifting of associated valves and dampers. NOTE: Although Relays 3AX and 3AY tripped during testing of sub-channels A and C, it was not immediately noticed, because Fan WMA-FN-54A was already operating.

Corrective Action:

PPM 7.4.3.2.1.15 has been revised. The new revision (Rev. 3) requires that after each sub-channel test (A, B, C, or D), the appropriate pushbutton WMA-RMS-FAZ/3AXY or 3BXY) will be depressed to reset the corresponding FAZ relay (3AX, 3AY, 3BX or 3BY). The new revision has been issued and surveillance testing accomplished without causing an inadvertent actuation.

Significance:

There were no safety consequences or implications associated with this event. There was no damage to any Plant components. There was no danger to Plant personnel or to the public.

Action Following Event:

Operator action taken after the start of the Control Room Emergency Fan was to restore the system to its previous state by depressing WMA-RMS-FAZ/3AXY and WMA-RMS-FAZ/3BXY.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397
April 11, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: **NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2**
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-017

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-017 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of noncompliance, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given on March 17, 1984.

Very truly yours,

J. D. Martin
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:de

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-017

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1450 Maria Lane
Walnut Creek, California 94596
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)

IE 22
11