



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

January 24, 1983

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-093/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station  
Unit No. 1, Environmental Technical Specifications, Section  
2.3.4b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable  
Occurrence 82-093/03L. This report is required within  
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272  
S PDR

Report Number: 82-093/03L  
Report Date: 01-24-83  
Occurrence Date: 12-25-82  
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Plant Vent Gross Activity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-521.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - RX Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2200 hours, December 25, 1982, during routine shutdown operations, the Control Room Operator noticed that the Plant Vent Gross Activity Monitor (Channel 1R16) indication had increased to greater than 45K counts per minute. A grab sample was obtained and analyzed; results indicated that there was no significant increase in the activity of the plant vent effluent. The monitor was declared inoperable, and action was taken to initiate repair of the instrument.

Section 2.3.4b of the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS) requires, with the gross activity monitor inoperable, daily grab samples of the plant vent effluent be taken. After seven days, plant vent gaseous releases must be terminated. These requirements were overlooked until January 4, 1983, when daily sampling was commenced. At 1645 hours January 6, 1983, repair of the monitor was completed, and it was returned to operation.

The stack iodine and particulate continuous monitors were operable throughout the occurrence, and indicated that no ETS limits were exceeded. The reactor head was installed, and the Reactor Coolant System was vented to the atmosphere; the system inventory of noble gases and iodine was appreciably reduced by decay and several months of shutdown operation.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the failure of the monitor revealed that the channel discriminator threshold had drifted low; the decreased discrimination caused actual radioactivity levels to be masked by indication of electronic noise. No other problems with the channel were evident, and no previous failures of this type had been noted.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Insufficient procedural controls existed to insure compliance with the ETS following the loss of the monitor. Existing procedures addressed inoperability of the channel and required that the ventilation path be isolated until an alternate monitoring method was established. The specific requirements of the ETS were not detailed, however.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Specifications for monitoring gaseous waste insure that ETS limits are met; the limits define adverse impact on the environment and are based on not exceeding maximum dose rates for the public contained in 10 CFR Part 20. The monitoring requirements also provide reasonable assurance that doses will be as low as practicable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.

Due to plant conditions during shutdown, a significant release of radioactive gaseous waste was extremely unlikely. As noted, no ETS limits were exceeded, and the event involved no adverse impact on the environment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The channel threshold voltage was adjusted, and the instrument was satisfactorily recalibrated and tested. As noted, the monitor was returned to operation on January 6, 1983, and compliance with the ETS was regained.

Personnel involved in the occurrence were counseled concerning the requirements of the ETS for monitoring gaseous releases. Procedures will be reviewed concerning the actions specified in the event of the inoperability of a monitor channel.

FAILURE DATA:

Tracer Lab  
Model RM-20B  
Log Ratemeter

Prepared By R. Frahm

  
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General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-08