U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/1/0/4/8/3/ (8) /0/1/1/9/8/3/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On January 4, 1983, with the Unit in Mode 2, the middle level corner support tem-/
/0/3/ / perature for the "A" Steam Generator indicated less than 225°F for 12 hours and /
/0/4/ / 15 minutes. Since the support temperature was not restored tc greater than 225°F/
/0/5/ / within 4 hours, the 12 hour period to reduce plant pressure below 1000 psig was /
/0/6/ / entered as required by the Action Statement and the health and safety of the /
/0/7/ / general public were not affected. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.4.10.2 and /
/0/8/ / reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/X/X/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/B/ (13)	/V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14)	/E/ (15)	/D/ (16)

	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)		/8/3/	/-/ /0/0/3/	/ / /0/3/	/L/	/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/F/ (18)	/C/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/V/1/3/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Condensation caused by high secondary steam leakage from a body-to-bonnet leak of/
/1/1/ / Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve 2-BD-2 wetted the thermal blanket cover-/
/1/2/ / ing the "A" Steam Generator support thereby lowering the support temperature. /
/1/3/ / Support temperature was increased by directing the steam leakage away from the /
/1/4/ / support blanket and verifying all support heaters energized. /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/E/ (28)	/0/0/2/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

8302010187 830119
PDR ADOCK 05000339
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /

NRC USE ONLY / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2 Attachment: Page 1 of 1
Docket No. 50-339
Report No. LER 83-003/03L-0

Description of Event

On January 4, 1983, with the Unit in Mode 2, the middle level corner support temperature for the "A" Steam Generator indicated less than 225°F for 12 hours and 15 minutes. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.4.10.2 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

For the A572 material of the Steam Generator Supports, operation above 225°F provides a conservative temperature limit and thus toughness level in the steel. The minimum temperature experienced was 210. This assures the safety of the A572 material even under the worst postulated accident conditions. On January 4, 1983, at 2210, the 12 hour period was entered to reduce plant pressure below 1000 psig as required by the Action Statement. The temperature was restored above the 225°F limit 8 hours and 15 minutes later at 0625 on January 5, 1983. Thus the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

Condensation caused by high secondary steam leakage from a body-to-bonnet leak of Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve 2-BD-2 wetted the thermal isolation blanket covering the "A" Steam Generator Support thereby lowering the support temperature.

Immediate Corrective Action

The steam emanating from the blowdown isolation valve was redirected away from the support blanket and all Steam Generator "A" Support Heaters were verified energized. The valve was temporarily repaired by injecting Furmanite between the body and bonnet and it was tested to insure freedom of movement.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The valve will be replaced or repaired during the next outage of sufficient duration.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is taken to prevent recurrence.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.