



GPU Nuclear

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January 11, 1983

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-60/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-60/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.3 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-60/03L

Report Date

January 11, 1983

Occurrence Date

December 10, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Less than the minimum required number of Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels were operational (in one trip system) with the reactor mode switch in the "refuel" position, as required by Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, Sections A.9 and K.6.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown.

Mode Switch Position: Shutdown

Description of Occurrence

On Friday, December 10, 1982 at 0213 hours, the reactor was shutdown by placing the reactor mode switch in "shutdown". When the reactor mode switch is placed in or removed from the "shutdown" position a reactor scram occurs. Also, a rod block is inserted in the "shutdown" mode. When the reactor scrammed by placing the mode switch in "shutdown", 19 of the control rods inserted only to the "02" position. In order to fully insert the control rods the reactor mode switch was placed in the "refuel" mode at 0227 hours. The resultant scram fully inserted all the control rods.

At 1806 hours, an administrative rod block was established preventing control rod withdrawal while in the "refuel" mode. No rod movement occurred between the time the reactor mode switch was placed in "refuel" and the administrative rod block was effected. On Saturday, December 11, 1982 at 1136 hours, IRM Channel 17 was returned to service following replacement of its preamplifier and successful completion of "IRM Front Panel Test and Calibration" procedure.

Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1 requires three IRM channels in each trip system to be operable when the reactor mode switch is in "refuel". IRM Channels 16 and 17 which are both in the same trip system, were considered to be out of service due to abnormal indications in range 9.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of this occurrence was a misinterpretation of Technical Specification requirements by Operations personnel. Since control rods would be fully inserted and no rods were to be moved while IRM channels 16 and 17 were inoperable, the protective instrumentation requirements of Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1 were believed to have been followed.

Analysis of Occurrence

Intermediate range monitors are required to be in operation during rod movement operations. The safety significance of this event is minimal since the control rods were fully inserted and not moved during the period of the occurrence. As an extra precaution, an administrative rod block was inserted to ensure that no rod movement occurred.

Corrective Action

IRM Channel 17 was repaired, tested, and returned to service. Channel 16 has also been returned to service with additional maintenance scheduled during the upcoming refueling outage. This Licensee Event Report will be placed on the control room personnel required reading list in order to emphasize strict compliance with Technical Specifications.