



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

May 9, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket Nos. 50-327
50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL
REPORT 95-03

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a pipe sleeve, various fire doors, and an equipment hatch that are nonfunctional as fire barriers. The pipe sleeve fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support the routing of a temporary hose. Two auxiliary building fire doors were intentionally breached open to facilitate the repair of ventilation system chillers. Four control building fire doors and an equipment hatch will be intermittently breached to support the replacement of the plant's 250-volt batteries. The pipe sleeve and the auxiliary building fire doors were nonfunctional as fire barriers for a time period greater than the TS allowable timeframe. The control building fire doors and equipment hatch will be nonfunctional as fire barriers for time periods greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (615) 843-7749.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell
Manager
SQN Site Licensing

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 95-03

I. PIPE SLEEVE

Description of Condition

On April 4, 1995, an auxiliary building pipe sleeve (Mark No. 574) that is located on Floor Elevation 690 was breached. This fire barrier was intentionally removed from service to support the implementation of a temporary alteration that routed a drain hose through the pipe sleeve. The pipe sleeve provides access between the hot sample room and the general auxiliary building floor area. The penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The pipe sleeve was breached to support the routing of a temporary drain hose. The temporary drain hose reroutes drain lines from the hot sample room chemistry monitors and sample sink to prevent the unnecessary processing of the liquid (approximately 1200 gallons per day) in the liquid radwaste system.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetration fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished after the completion of permanent plant modifications to the chemistry monitor and sample sink drain lines in the hot sample room. The modification is anticipated to be complete three months after the completion of the upcoming Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling outage.

II. AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE DOORS

Description of Condition

On April 18, 1995, two auxiliary building fire doors (A-180, Unit 1 and A-193, Unit 2) located on Floor Elevation 749 were breached. These fire doors provide access between the A and B 480-volt (V) electric board rooms for each unit. The doors have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The A-180 and A-193 doors were intentionally breached to facilitate cross ventilation between the Unit 1, A and B 480-V electric board rooms and between the Unit 2, A and B 480-V electric board rooms during the performance of maintenance activities on related ventilation system chillers.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetrations are reestablished as fire barriers. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the completion of maintenance activities on the associated ventilation system chillers. The maintenance activities are expected to be complete by July 17, 1995.

III. CONTROL BUILDING FIRE DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCH

Description of Condition

On May 1, 1995, two control building fire doors (C-6 and C-7) located on Floor Elevation 669 and an equipment hatch between turbine building Floor Elevation 685 and control building Floor Elevation 669 were breached. The fire doors provide access for two of four 250-V battery rooms. These fire doors are being breached by temporary electrical cable routed through the door transoms to support the replacement of the plant's 250-V batteries. The equipment hatch will be opened for multiple 10-day intervals for battery movement throughout the duration of the battery replacement project. After the batteries in these two rooms are replaced, Fire Doors C-4 and C-5 will be breached in a similar manner for battery replacement. The fire doors and equipment hatch will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The fire doors and equipment hatch are being intentionally breached to facilitate the replacement of the plant's 250-V batteries. The work was preplanned and is being performed in stages to minimize plant impact.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the penetrations are reestablished as fire barriers. The fire barriers will be reestablished after the completion of the battery replacement project. The project is expected to be complete by October 30, 1995.