

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

January 19, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 82-062

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-062 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.3.3.3, "Seismic Instrumentation," on December 20, 1982.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD:dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	A. R. Koon
T. C. Nichols, Jr.	G. D. Moffatt
E. C. Roberts	Site QA
O. W. Dixon, Jr.	C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
H. N. Cyrus	G. J. Braddick
H. T. Babb	J. L. Skolds
D. A. Nauman	J. B. Knotts, Jr.
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly
LER No. 82-062
Page Two
January 19, 1983

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 20, 1982, with the Plant in Mode 1, the Reactor Building Foundation Mat Triaxial Seismic Switch (YM-1782) was found to have an out-of-tolerance trip point on the Transverse Sensor. The trip point was found to be set at approximately 0.16g instead of the required 0.1g during performance of the Channel Operational Test identified in Technical Specification 3.3.3.3, Table 4.3-4, Item 1.c. The seismic switch is designed to initiate an alarm upon the recognition of a seismic event yielding a ground acceleration greater than or equal to the Operating Base Earthquake (OBE).

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

There were no adverse consequences from this event. At the time of discovery of this event, there were other seismic instruments in operation which would have properly recorded earthquakes and provided alarms. A response spectrum recorder at the same location provides indication and alarm in the Control Room for any earthquakes producing ground motion greater than or equal to the OBE (.1g), while a seismic trigger unit at the same location (set to .01g horizontal and .0067g vertical) activates two (2) time history accelerographs and produces an audible alarm. Therefore, instrumentation was available to adequately record seismic events. Additionally, the seismic switch is a triaxial device capable of acceleration measurement in three (3) orthogonal directions (one vertical and two horizontal) and initiation of alarms as a function of these measurements. The Horizontal (Longitudinal) and Vertical Sensors of this seismic switch would have operated.

CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to setpoint drift on the Horizontal (Transverse) Sensor of Seismic Switch YM-1782.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

A calibration of the triaxial seismic switch was performed with the appropriate surveillance test procedure, and the equipment was subsequently returned to service on December 21, 1982.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The Licensee plans no additional action in regards to this event other than the normal surveillance testing.