

## Nebraska Public Power District

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March 28, 1984

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief

- Reference:
- 1) Letter from T. A. Ippolito to J. M. Pilant dated November 17, 1979
  - 2) Letter from J. M. Pilant to T. A. Ippolito dated February 8, 1980, "Containment Purge and Venting System"
  - 3) Letter from T. A. Ippolito to J. M. Pilant dated October 26, 1981
  - 4) Letter from J. M. Pilant to T. A. Ippolito dated December, 1981 (LQA8100277), "Containment Purge and Venting System"

Dear Mr. Vassallo:

Subject: Containment Purge and Vent System Unresolved Issues  
Cooper Nuclear Station  
NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46

Reference 1 requested information for three staff concerns relative to the purge and venting system at Cooper Nuclear Station. These concerns are:

1. Isolation valve closure prevention by debris.
2. Increased leakage rate surveillance of the valves due to seal deterioration.
3. Damage to safety-related equipment downstream due to escaping air and steam.

Reference 2 provided a response to the staff's request. Subsequently, reference 3 requested additional information on these subjects and reference 4 provided the District's final evaluation. Recently the staff contacted the District to inform

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
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that the three issues listed above still require resolution. At the request of the staff, this letter is written to provide the District's plan for resolving these remaining three issues.

1. Debris Strainers - The District is in receipt of a design for debris strainers which would be acceptable to the staff. By July 1, 1984, the District will either submit a safety justification as to why these debris strainers are not required, or commit to install the strainers. It is recognized that if the staff does not accept our safety justification, debris strainers will be required and installed.
2. Leak Rate Testing - It is the staff's recommendation that a test be performed on these valves on a three-month interval to test for degradation of the resilient seats (Reference 3, Enclosure 1). By July 1, 1984, the District will either present plant specific data to justify the long-term capability of the seats, or propose an alternative test interval to the Appendix ~ two-year test interval.
3. Standby Gas Treatment System Use While Purging - In the development of the Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications (RETS) the staff recommends that the Standby Gas Treatment System be utilized while purging to filter activity due to iodine spiking. Additionally, if a LOCA occurs while purging, one train of the standby gas treatment system may be damaged; therefore, the staff recommends a SBTG system use limit of 90 hours/year. The District will resolve this issue when our RETS are finalized, and endeavor to establish criteria with a 90 hour/year limit on the SBTG use as the goal.

Please advise me if this plan is not in accordance with the staff's scheduling commitments.

Sincerely,

  
J. M. Pilant  
Technical Staff Manager  
Nuclear Power Group

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