



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
Hope Creek Generating Station

May 15, 1995

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
HOPE CREEK GENERATION STATION UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-354

In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Hope Creek Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for April are being forwarded to you with the summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented during April 1995 pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b).

Sincerely yours,

R. J. Hovey
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

DRK and
DR:WS:JC
Attachments

C Distribution

9505180223 950430
PDR ADDCK 05000354
R PDR

The Energy People

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AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT Hope Creek
DATE 05/03/95
COMPLETED BY D. W. Lyons
TELEPHONE (609) 339-3517

MONTH April 1995

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
(MWe-Net)

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
(MWe-Net)

1. 1061
2. 995
3. 1068
4. 1052
5. 1062
6. 1061
7. 1056
8. 931
9. 1042
10. 1057
11. 1062
12. 1047
13. 1055
14. 1056
15. 1056
16. 1051

17. 1056
18. 1053
19. 1035
20. 1053
21. 1046
22. 1042
23. 1045
24. 1059
25. 1053
26. 1053
27. 1053
28. 1042
29. 899
30. 1049
31. N/A

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-354
 UNIT Hope Creek
 DATE 05/03/95
 COMPLETED BY D. W. Lyons
 TELEPHONE (609) 339-3517

OPERATING STATUS

1. Reporting Period April 1995 Gross Hours in Report Period 719
2. Currently Authorized Power Level (MWt) 3293
 Max. Depend. Capacity (MWe-Net) 1031
 Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net) 1067
3. Power Level to which restricted (if any) (MWe-Net) None
4. Reasons for restriction (if any)
5. No. of hours reactor was critical

	This Month	Yr To Date	Cumulative
5. No. of hours reactor was critical	<u>719.0</u>	<u>2719.6</u>	<u>62655.5</u>
6. Reactor reserve shutdown hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
7. Hours generator on line	<u>719.0</u>	<u>2698.0</u>	<u>61701.4</u>
8. Unit reserve shutdown hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
9. Gross thermal energy generated (MWH)	<u>2340290</u>	<u>8739235</u>	<u>197153581</u>
10. Gross electrical energy generated (MWH)	<u>781187</u>	<u>2928349</u>	<u>65356015</u>
11. Net electrical energy generated (MWH)	<u>750262</u>	<u>2807300</u>	<u>62460616</u>
12. Reactor service factor	<u>100.0</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>85.5</u>
13. Reactor availability factor	<u>100.0</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>85.5</u>
14. Unit service factor	<u>100.0</u>	<u>93.7</u>	<u>84.2</u>
15. Unit availability factor	<u>100.0</u>	<u>93.7</u>	<u>84.2</u>
16. Unit capacity factor (using MDC)	<u>101.2</u>	<u>94.6</u>	<u>82.7</u>
17. Unit capacity factor (Using Design MWe)	<u>97.8</u>	<u>91.4</u>	<u>79.9</u>
18. Unit forced outage rate	<u>0.0</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>4.8</u>
19. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date, & duration):
 Refueling Outage #6 scheduled to begin November 8, 1995
20. If shutdown at end of report period, estimated date of start-up:
 N/A

Design Changes

Summary of Safety Evaluation

4HE-00083: This Design Change Package installs 1 inch vent and drain valves in various locations in the Residual Heat Removal Piping system. These valves will improve the venting and draining of the system and reduce the draining time involved. The design basis of the RHR system will not be changed. They will be closed during normal operation and there is no reason to reposition these valves. FSAR Figure 5.4-13 (P&ID M51-1) will require revision to address these changes to plant configuration.

Therefore, this DCP does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve any Unreviewed Safety Question.

Other

Summary of Safety Evaluation

Incident Report 95-096: This incident report was issued due to the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) ECCS valves air Regulator failing high. This review describes failing open of numerous SACS Supply Valves to the Diesel Generator room cooler, HPCI room coolers, RHR room coolers, Core Spray Pump room coolers, and FRVS coolers. The valves described all have Hiller Actuators. Of the 32 valves identified as having Hiller Actuators, 9 valves have Conoflow style air regulators. To date we have tested 2 of the valves with this style air regulator and none have failed. Of the remaining 23 valves 15 have been tested. Of these 15, there have been five failures. Testing of the remaining 8 valves with the old style regulators (C.A.Norgren Co) is in progress but for the purpose of analysis it is assumed that the remaining 8 valves also fail.

The UFSAR mentions that each SACS valve is interlocked with and will close when the associated ECCS, D/G, and FRVS Room Cooler fan is out of service. Failing these valves to the open position bypasses the interlock between the fans and the SACS valves. The UFSAR illustrates these valves in the closed position. Therefore this changes the facility as described in the SAR.

The SACS system has sufficient cooling flow and heat removal capacity to satisfy the service and cooling requirements of the Engineered safety Feature (ESF) equipment and Turbine Auxiliary during normal and emergency conditions. For emergencies the valves in question are equipped with a fail open feature. During a LOP or LOCA the valves will already be in the correct conditions. The SACS pumps are adequately designed and have sufficient excess capacity to provide flow with all the valves in question failed open.

Therefore, this Safety Evaluation for Incident Report 95-096 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

OPERATING DATA REPORT
UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT Hope Creek
DATE 05/03/95
COMPLETED BY D. W. Lyons
TELEPHONE (609) 339-3517

MONTH April 1995

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR OR REDUCING POWER (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENTS
1.		NONE				

REFUELING INFORMATION

DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT Hope Creek 1
DATE 05/03/95
COMPLETED BY R. Schmidt
TELEPHONE (609) 339-3740

MONTH April 1995

1. Refueling information has changed from last month:
Yes ☒ No ☐
2. Scheduled date for next refueling: 11/11/95
3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: 12/10/95
4. A. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?
Yes ☐ No ☒
B. Has the Safety Evaluation covering the COLR been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee?
Yes ☐ No ☒
If no, when is it scheduled? August 28, 1995
5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action:
Not required.
6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling:
N/A
7. Number of Fuel Assemblies:

A. Incore	<u>764</u>
B. In Spent Fuel Storage (prior to refueling)	<u>1240</u>
C. In Spent Fuel Storage (after refueling)	<u>1472</u>
8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 4006
Future spent fuel storage capacity: 4006
9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: 5/3/2006
(EOC13)
(Does allow for full-core offload)
(Assumes 244 bundle reloads every 18 months until then)
(Does not allow for smaller reloads due to improved fuel)

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

MONTHLY OPERATING SUMMARY

April 1995

Hope Creek entered the month of April operating at 100% power. It continued to operate at essentially 100% power throughout the month.

Two small power reductions were made to facilitate repairs to plant equipment. On April 8 & 9, 1995 power was reduced for condensate polisher bed cleaning. On April 29, 1995 power was reduced to facilitate a leak repair for a turbine bypass valve.

As of April 30, 1995 the unit has been on line for 35 days.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

April 1995

The following items have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.