

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Failure to Perform SP-322															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N/A			DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0			
0 3	1 3	8 4	8 4	0 0 6	0 0 0	0 4	1 0	8 4	N/A			0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
1		20.402(b)				20.408(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)	
0 9 8		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
NAME W. K. Bandhauer, Nuclear Safety Supervisor										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 0 4 7 9 5 - 6 4 8 6					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 13, 1984, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was taken out of service for maintenance at 0204. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 action 'a', the surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a.2 must be performed within one hour. Surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a.2 implies that to assure operability of the 230 KV supply to CR 3, it must be assured that the sump pumps in the tunnel containing the DC control feeds to the 230 KV switchgear are operable. Due to operator error, this was not done until 0440, i.e., two hours and thirty-six minutes later.

Personnel involved in this event have been counseled by their supervisor. No further action is considered appropriate.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 0 6	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EVENT ASSESSMENT

On March 13, 1983, at 0204, Crystal River Unit 3 was operating at 98% reactor (AC) power (887 MWe). There were no major equipment outages and only routine maintenance items were scheduled for performance. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EK, DG) was taken out of service for routine mechanical and electrical maintenance.

With one Emergency Diesel Generator out of service, Technical Specifications require that the operability of the sump pumps (WK, P) in the tunnel containing the D.C. control power cables (EJ, CBL) to the 230 KV switchyard be assured within one hour. This is accomplished by performance of SP-322, Cable Tunnel Sump Pumps Operability Verification. The performance of that SP was not accomplished until 0440 on March 13.

The licensed operators are and were fully aware of the requirements, but failed to perform the surveillance within the required time frame. The operable condition of the sump pumps was determined satisfactorily after a review of Technical Specification requirements was made by the operators and the error was noted.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

The assurance of sump pump operability, though specified in Technical Specifications, is not vital to supplying D.C. control power to the 230 KV switchyard. All cabling in the tunnel is designed to function totally submerged.

ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS


1. This event had no impact on plant safety.
2. The event cause was cognitive personnel error.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Personnel involved in this event have been counseled by their supervisor. No further action is considered appropriate.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

This is the first instance of failure to perform the verification of sump pump operability within the required time while performing Diesel Generator maintenance.



**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

April 10, 1984  
3F0484-06

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-302  
Operating License No. DPR-72  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-006-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 84-006-00 which is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer  
Manager, Nuclear Operations  
Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, GA 30303

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