

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																
Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 1 of 0 3			Page (3) 1 of 0 3			
Title (4) Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry Due to Inoperable Containment Emergency Cooling Fans																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)			
0	4	1	2	9	5	9	5	0	5	0	NONE		0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0 0 //////////////////// //////////////////// //////////////////// //////////////////// ////////////////////			20.402(b) _____				20.405(c) _____				50.73(a)(2)(iv) _____				73.71(b) _____	
			20.405(a)(1)(i) _____				50.36(c)(1) _____				50.73(a)(2)(v) _____				73.71(c) _____	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii) _____				50.36(c)(2) _____				50.73(a)(2)(vii) _____				Other (Specify in	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii) _____				50.73(a)(2)(i) _____				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) _____				Abstract below and	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv) _____				50.73(a)(2)(ii) _____				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) _____				in text)	
20.405(a)(1)(v) _____			50.73(a)(2)(iii) _____				50.73(a)(2)(x) _____									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-	REPORTABLE	////////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-	REPORTABLE	////////					
			TURER	TO NPRDS	////////				TURER	TO NPRDS	////////					
					////////						////////					
					////////						////////					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year	
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) _____												X	NO			
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																

On 4/12/95, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 following a refueling outage, Edison engineers (utility, nonlicensed), in performing a system walkdown to compile data on plant relays, discovered an aerosol spray can of electrical contact cleaner in an auxiliary compartment of 480 volt class 1E load center 2B04. The compartment contains electrical relays for the Train A containment emergency cooling fans.

During a seismic event, the can had the potential of impacting the relays, causing possible contact chatter of the relays or short circuits on the DC control power to the breaker controls. Because load center 2B04 is required to be seismically qualified, Edison considers that the Train A containment emergency cooling fans were inoperable.

Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 requires two independent groups of containment cooling fans to be operable (with two fan systems in each group) in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. This specification has no action statement for one group of containment cooling fans inoperable with both containment spray systems inoperable [in Mode 4 both trains of containment spray were out of service]. This situation existed from 0050 on 4/6/95 through 0609 on 4/7/95, and again from 1809 on 4/8/95 through 1430 on 4/12/95. Therefore, Edison is reporting those occurrences in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

The can was most likely inadvertently left in the compartment during bus cleaning and inspection activities earlier in the outage.

The can was removed immediately upon discovery. Edison will remind appropriate work groups of the need to remove such items, and the adverse consequences of leaving supplies or equipment inside of electrical switchgear.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER 05000361	LER NUMBER 95-008-00	PAGE 2 of 3
---	---------------------------	-------------------------	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
 Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
 Event Date: April 12, 1995
 Mode: Mode 4, Hot Shutdown
 Pressure: approximately 345 to 2250 psia
 Temperature: approximately 200 to 333 F

On 4/12/95, Unit 2 was in Mode 4 for heatup and startup following a refueling outage. At approximately 1430, Edison engineers (utility, nonlicensed) were performing a system walkdown to compile data on plant relays. They discovered an aerosol spray can of Inhibisol brand electrical contact cleaner in auxiliary compartment 2B0408 of 480 volt class 1E load center 2B04 [ED]. This compartment contains electrical relays for Train A containment emergency cooling fans [BK] 2E399 and 2E401, in addition to other equipment not required for Mode 4.

During a seismic event, the spray can had the potential of impacting the relays for the emergency cooling fans, causing possible contact chatter of the relays or short circuits on the DC control power to the cooling fan breaker controls. Because load center 2B04 is required to be seismically qualified, Edison considers that the containment emergency cooling fans 2E399 and 2E401 were inoperable.

Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 requires two independent groups of containment cooling fans to be operable (with two fan systems in each group) in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. This specification has no action statement for one group of containment cooling fans inoperable with both containment spray systems inoperable [in Mode 4 both trains of containment spray were out of service]. This situation existed from 0050 on 4/6/95 through 0609 on 4/7/95, and again from 1809 on 4/8/95 through 1430 on 4/12/95. Therefore, Edison is reporting those occurrences in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

The aerosol spray can was most likely inadvertently left in the auxiliary compartment during bus cleaning and inspection activities conducted earlier in the Unit 2 refueling outage. Subsequent investigation could not identify the individual who left the can in the compartment.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The aerosol spray can was removed immediately upon discovery.

Edison will remind appropriate work groups of the need to remove such items, and the adverse consequences of leaving supplies or equipment inside of electrical switchgear.

Additionally, Edison is performing an investigation of this event and will implement further corrective actions if required.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The Train B containment emergency coolers remained operable during these periods. One train of containment emergency coolers is sufficient to maintain containment pressure and temperature within design limits for the limiting Mode 4 event (a loss of coolant accident from 350 F and 2250 psia).

Had the plant continued to power operation with the spray can present, two trains of the containment spray system and one train of containment emergency coolers should have been available and sufficient to meet design basis containment energy removal requirements.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION	DOCKET NUMBER	LER NUMBER	PAGE
UNIT 2	05000361	95-008-00	3 of 3

Therefore, the safety significance of this event was minimal.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There have been no similar LER events involving unauthorized material found in electrical switchgear in the previous three years.