

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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LICENSEE CODE								LICENSE NUMBER								LICENSE TYPE								CAT 58							

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 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 7 1 2 2 2 8 3 8 0 1 0 5 8 4 9
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
 While at 0% power, routine shutdown operations, it was discovered that schedule 40 versus standard wall pipe was installed in portions of the service water system. The pipe stress and hanger loading analyses were performed assuming standard wall pipe. An evaluation showed all pipe stresses to be within code allowable limits, however 5 hangers were undersized based on present requirements. Two hangers had undersized snubbers, while 3 hangers had a factor of safety less than 4 but greater than 2 on their anchor bolts. Similar LER's: None

SYSTEM CODE W A 11	CAUSE CODE B 12	CAUSE SUBCODE C 13	COMPONENT CODE P I P E X X 14	COMP. SUBCODE E 15	VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
LER-RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 17	EVENT YEAR 8 3 21	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21	HOURS 0 0 0 0 22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25
ACTION TAKEN F 18	FUTURE ACTION Z 19	EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 1 24	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 28	REPORT TYPE T 30
			REVISION NO. 0 32		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27
 It is believed that due to material availability, schedule 40 pipe was installed in portions of the service water system in lieu of standard wall. This change was not reflected in the stress analysis at that time. While performing system modifications the discrepancy was noted and the stress analysis updated. Due to increased loadings, 4 hangers were modified. The fifth hanger was no longer undersized due to piping modifications performed during the present shutdown.

FACILITY STATUS H 28	% POWER 0 0 0 29	OTHER STATUS NA 30	METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Stress Analysis Update 32
ACTIVITY RELEASED Z 33	CONTENT OF RELEASE Z 34	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35	LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36	
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37	TYPE Z 38	DESCRIPTION NA 39		
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40	DESCRIPTION NA 41			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42	DESCRIPTION NA 43			
PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44	DESCRIPTION NA 45			

IE22

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 PDR ADOCK 05000336
 S PDR

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-31/01T-0
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
FACILITY OPERATION LICENSE NO. DPR-65
DOCKET NO. 50-336

Event Description and Probable Consequences

While performing piping modifications on the service water system it was discovered that schedule 40 pipe versus standard wall was used. The pipe stress analysis was performed assuming standard wall pipe. The thicker walled pipe would have caused the overloading of 5 hangers during a seismic event. Two of the 5 hangers had snubbers insufficiently sized for the load, while the remaining 3 had a factor of safety less than 4 but greater than 2 on their anchor bolts.

Cause Description and Corrective Action

It is believed that due to material availability, schedule 40 pipe was installed in portions of the service water system, in lieu of standard wall. The isometric drawings reflected the actual wall thickness installed. However, the stress analysis for these piping runs was not updated to reflect the heavier pipe. A review of all service water isometric drawings has identified all portions of the system in which the heavier wall pipe was installed. Random UT sampling has confirmed that the isometric drawings reflect the actual installed pipe configuration. The stress analysis on these piping runs was reperformed using the as-built configuration. This reanalysis identified 4 hangers needing modifications. The fifth hanger was no longer undersized due to piping modifications performed during the present shutdown. The hanger modifications were performed and the service water system was returned to normal operation. A preliminary review has identified the RBCCW system as another Category 1 system for which standard wall pipe was specified. A review of a sample of RBCCW isometric drawings and the results of UT data indicate that standard wall pipe was installed as prescribed in the pipe specification. No further corrective action is required.

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No 50-336
Reportable Occurrence RO-50-336-83-31/01T-0

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 83-31/01T-0 required to be submitted within 14 days pursuant to Millstone Unit 2 Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.i. This report concerns the discovery, during service water system modifications, of conditions not specifically considered in the Safety Analysis Report or Technical Specifications that may require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading 'R. J. Herbert'.

BY: R. J. Herbert
Station Services Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TF:ejl

Attachment: LER RO-50-336/83-31/01T-0

cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D. C.
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D.C.

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