

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

REPORT SOURCE 16 60 DOCKET NUMBER 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Observations of fire protection deficiencies have been listed in the attachment to this LER. The attachment consists of a list which includes the discovery date, facility status code, method of discovery code, discovery description, cause code, cause and corrective actions. These occurrences are reportable per Technical Specification (T.S.) 6.9.1.9.b. Other occurrences regarding fire protection deficiencies were reported in LER's (50-368) 79-025, 79-026, 80-081, 81-029, 81-036, 81-042, 82-029, 82-039, 83-004, 83-008, 83-020, 83-021, 83-026, 83-032, 83-033, 83-034, 83-037 and 83-042. Also reference LER 83-035.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 13 14 COMPONENT CODE 15 16 COMP SUBCODE 17 18 VALVE SUBCODE 19 20

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 18 EVENT YEAR 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 25 OCCURRENCE CODE 28 29 REPORT TYPE 30 31 REVISION NO. 32 33

ACTION TAKEN 33 34 FUTURE ACTION 34 35 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 36 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 37 HOURS 37 38 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41 42 NPRD-4 FORM SUB 42 43 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 44 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 45

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

The causes and corrective actions for the individual occurrences are listed in the attachment. A complete fire protection system walkdown inspection is in progress as validation of the "ANO Fire Protection Program Manual." Interim controls have been placed on construction activities to assure restoration of fire systems after work is performed. In the interim, AP&L has established a roving fire inspector program for the purpose of monitoring activities affecting fire systems. Future action to prevent recurrence is the development of an integrated

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

FACILITY STATUS 9 10 % POWER 10 11 OTHER STATUS 13 14 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 15 16 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 17 18

ACTIVITY RELEASED 9 10 CONTENT 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 13 14 LOCATION OF RELEASE 17 18

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 9 10 TYPE 10 11 DESCRIPTION 12 13

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 9 10 DESCRIPTION 10 11

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 9 10 DESCRIPTION 10 11

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PUBLICITY ISSUED 9 10 DESCRIPTION 10 11

NRC USE ONLY 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

NAME OF PREPARER: Patrick Rogers

PHONE: (501) 964-3100

8401100342 831229
PDR ADOCK 05000368
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

LER No. 50-368/83-045/03X-5

Occurrence Date: 09/16/83

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONTINUED)

program to provide assurance that fire systems are maintained as required.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 1
DISCOVERY DATE: 9/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: A special inspection of fire door gaps subsequent to LER 83-033 was performed. As committed in LER 83-042 the following discrepancies which were observed as a result of the special inspection are reported below. Excessive gap between door and floor or threshold for the following:
1) Fire door 312 to CEDM room
2) Fire door 447 to ventilation equipment room
3) Fire door 283 to Stairway 2001
4) Fire door 341 to shift supv office
5) Fire door 287 to controlled access
6) Fire door 282 to HP change area
7) Fire door 257 to elect equip room
8) Fire door 269 between ES switchgear rooms
9) Fire door 275 to cable spreading room
10) Fire door 276 to cable spreading room
11) Fire door 260 to diesel gen room
12) Fire door 263 to Stairway 2001
13) Fire door 265 to D.C. equip room
14) Fire door 266 to D.C. equip room
15) Fire door 268 to E.S. switchgear room
16) Fire door 442 to vacuum degassifier room
17) Fire door 264 to MCC room
18) Fire door 213 to Stairway 2001
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire door gap inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: Original installation specifications did not address gaps between doors and floors or thresholds
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Posted fire watch; gaps repaired to meet current acceptance criteria with the exception of Doors 260, 268 and 257 where a fire watch is being maintained until repairs are made.

ITEM NO: 2
DISCOVERY DATE: 09/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: Condulet knockout seal plugs missing on condulets for security system on Door 342 to the control room.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator observation
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: Unknown: review of past job relating to the door do not indicate any reason for the missing plugs.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Fire watch; sealed openings with appropriate condulet seal plugs.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 3
DISCOVERY DATE: 09/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: E
DESCRIPTION: As a continuation of Item 1 above, the following discrepancies were observed. Excessive gap between door and floor or threshold for the following;
1) Fire Door 259 to diesel generator room
2) Fire Door 448 to sample preparation room
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire door gap inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: Original installation specifications did not address gaps between doors and floors or thresholds.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Fire watch; gaps repaired to meet current acceptance criteria.

ITEM NO: 4
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/8/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: While performing a design change in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) control room console the penetrations for Conduits EC-1336 and EC-2385 were found to be unsealed. The control room is manned continuously. Also a fire watch was present in the area due to other activities.
METNOD OF DISCOVERY: A
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Incidental observation
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The conduit penetrations were sealed in accordance with applicable requirements. An inspection was performed, and the sealing was found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 5
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/13/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2081 revealed that a conduit penetrating the door frame for Fire Door FD-381 was not sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The conduit penetration was sealed. An inspection was performed and the repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 6
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/13/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2153 revealed a conduit penetration above Fire Door FD-447 had not been sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was sealed by approved sealing methods. An inspection was conducted, and the sealing was found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 7
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2101 revealed Conduit J3902 had a cover plate missing.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The cover plate for the conduit was replaced. Subsequent inspection verified satisfactory repairs.

ITEM NO: 8
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2154 revealed that a cover for the end of Conduit J4337 had been left off.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was immediately posted. The cover was replaced, and a subsequent inspection found the conduit sealing to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| ITEM NO: | 9 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 10/14/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection of Room 2107 revealed a hole in the east wall of the Number 1 diesel generator room. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during construction or incomplete restoration after maintenance. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | A fire watch was posted immediately. The hole in the wall was sealed using approved methods. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory. |
| | |
| ITEM NO.: | 10 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 10/14/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection of Room 2198, Shift Supervisor's office revealed that the frame for Fire Door FD-341 was degraded. Approximately 8 square inches in the area of the latch was missing. The Shift Supervisor's office is adjacent and open to the control room which is manned continuously and has fire detection equipment. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. This discrepancy could have resulted because of inadequate controls during installation/modification or incomplete restoration following maintenance. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | The door frame was sealed in accordance with approved methods. An inspection was made, and the repairs were found to be satisfactory. |

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO.: 11
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2107 revealed 5 small (approximately 1/8') holes penetrating one side of Fire Door FD-262.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in the door were repaired. An inspection was made, and the repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 12
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2096 revealed 3 small (approximately 1/8') holes penetrating one side of fire door FD-264.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in the door were sealed. An inspection was made, and the repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 13
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2139 revealed 7 small (approximately 1/8") holes penetrating one side of fire door FD-283.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in FD-283 were sealed. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 14
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-314 was found to have 4 small (approximately 1/8") holes in one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls following maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in the door were sealed in accordance with approved methods.

ITEM NO: 15
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: A inspection revealed an unsealed ventilation duct penetration in the Unit 2 Diesel Storage Vault Tank Room.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during construction or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was immediately posted. The penetration was sealed per applicable requirements, inspected and found satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 16
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed two small (approximately 1/8") holes in one side of Fire Door 381.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation of a fire door associated with such holes in one side was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in the door were repaired, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 17
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/14/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-278 was found to have 3 small (approximately 1/8") holes in it.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch in the immediate area was informed of the discrepancy so as to establish a fire watch of the door. The holes in the door were repaired, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 18
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/15/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed a missing cover plate on Conduit CO-807 which penetrates the west wall of the cable spreading room.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cover plate had been removed because of maintenance activities. The contract workers involved had left the work location without posting a fire watch. This was the condition when the deficiency was identified.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The cover was subsequently replaced during the course of the maintenance activities.

ITEM NO: 19
DISCOVERY DATE: 11/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the 354' elevation of the Auxiliary Building revealed an unsealed penetration and a conduit without cover.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was sealed and the conduit cover was replaced. Subsequent inspection verified satisfactory repairs.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 20
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed an open penetration in the ceiling of the vacuum degasifier tank room in the Auxiliary Building.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was sealed, inspected, and found to be adequate.

ITEM NO: 21
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/16/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Fire Door FD-287 revealed that the door was not closing fully.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have been caused by inadequate restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was established immediately. The door was adjusted to allow proper closure. The repair was inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 22
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-265 was found to have four small (approximately 1/8") holes on one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 23
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-271 was found to have four small (approximately 1/8") holes on one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 24
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-274 was found to have three small (approximately 1/8") holes on one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 25
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-268 was found to have five small (approximately 1/8") holes on one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 26
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-272 was found to have three small (approximately 1/8") holes in one side.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected, and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 27
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/17/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed two ventilation dampers in the diesel fuel storage vault to be wired open rather than be held open by heat fusible links.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have occurred from inadequate controls during construction or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. Fusible links were installed per specification.

ITEM NO: 28
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/18/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: Fire Door FD-275 was found to have small holes in it.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door. The deficiency associated with such holes in fire doors was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected, and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 29
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/18/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed three unsealed penetrations in the east wall of the cable spreading room.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration during maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetrations were sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 30
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/19/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of Room 2093 (south diesel generator room) revealed unsealed penetrations in the east wall.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have resulted from inadequate controls during construction or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was immediately posted. The penetrations were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 31
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/22/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed the penetration of the east wall of the diesel fuel vault for the interceptor drain pipe to be improperly sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The penetration was subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 32
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/24/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed five small (approximately 1/8") holes in fire door FD-266.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during modification or maintenance of the fire door. The degradation associated with such holes was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriter's Laboratories.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes were subsequently sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 33
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/27/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed a conduit in the cable spreading room had a cover plate missing.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency was resulted from inadequate work controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was established immediately. The cover was subsequently replaced, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 34
DISCOVERY DATE: 10/27/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection revealed a hole (approximately 1") in fire door FD-341.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the fire door.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: A fire watch was established immediately. The hole was sealed, inspected and found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| ITEM NO: | 35 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 10/15/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection by Unit one personnel revealed an improperly secured junction box (2JB-821) in the diesel fuel storage vault (elevation 350'). On 11/11/83 this deficiency was determined to be reportable per Unit 2 Technical Specifications. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency resulted from inadequate work controls during installation or incomplete restoration after maintenance. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTION: | The junction box was secured, inspected and found to be satisfactory by 10/23/83. |
| | |
| ITEM NO: | 36 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 10/16/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection by Unit one personnel revealed the diesel fire pump exhaust pipe to have an inadequate penetration seal. On 11/11/83 this deficiency was determined to be reportable per Unit 2 Technical Specifications. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | E |
| CAUSE: | The penetration seal had degraded due to the extreme temperature fluctuations of the exhaust pipe. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTION: | The seal was replaced, inspected and found to be satisfactory by 10/22/83. |
| | |
| ITEM NO: | 37 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 11/03/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection of Room 2152 revealed 9 small holes of approximately 1/8" in diameter in fire door FD-320. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | A |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls during maintenance or modification of the Fire Door. The degradation of a fire door with such holes was not recognized until recent communications with Underwriters Laboratories. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | A fire watch was posted immediately. The holes in the door were repaired. An inspection was performed, and repairs were found to be satisfactory. |

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 38
DISCOVERY DATE 11/9/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the emergency diesel fuel storage vault revealed that Conduits C8-099 and C8-100 which penetrate a fire barrier were open ended with no cabling.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch had previously been established in the area. Fire watch personnel were immediately notified of the new deficiencies. Conduit plugs were installed for both conduits. Followup inspections verified repairs to be satisfactory.

ITEM NO: 39
DISCOVERY DATE 11/11/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the cable spreading room (Room 2098) revealed that the end of Conduit J4-908 was not sealed.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiency could have been a result of inadequate controls during installation or modification.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Fire watch personnel previously assigned were notified of the new deficiency. The conduit was sealed with foam. An inspection was performed, and the seal was found to be satisfactory.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

ITEM NO: 40
DISCOVERY DATE: 11/23/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the component cooling water room revealed that a conduit elbow cover was missing. The conduit was sealed on the opposite side of the fire barrier but the missing cover rendered the fire barrier technically inoperable.
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: B
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or modification or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. The conduit elbow cover was replaced thereby restoring operability of the fire barrier.

ITEM NO: 41
DISCOVERY DATE: 11/25/83
FACILITY STATUS CODE: H
DESCRIPTION: An inspection of the wall between the EFW pump rooms access area (334' elevation) and a piping area revealed two open penetrations (one approximately 2" in diameter and the other approximately 4" in diameter).
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Special fire barrier inspection
CAUSE CODE: A
CAUSE: The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The deficiencies could have resulted from inadequate work controls during construction or incomplete restoration following maintenance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: A fire watch was posted immediately. A job order has been issued for repair of the deficiencies. When the work is complete, an inspection will be performed to verify adequacy of the repairs.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| ITEM NO: | 42 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 11/25/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection of the electrical equipment room behind Door 257 revealed an open three inch conduit without an internal seal. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | A job order was issued to correct the deficiency. When work is completed, an inspection will be performed to verify the adequacy of the repair. |
| | |
| ITEM NO: | 43 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 11/29/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | An inspection of the wall between the south switchgear Room 2A4 and station battery Room 2D12 revealed a 1 inch square hole and a crack through the wall. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | A fire watch was immediately posted. A job order was issued for repair. The hole and crack were sealed with grout and verified to be acceptable on 12/5/83. |

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-045 (Continued)

Fire Barrier Deficiencies


| | |
|------------------------|--|
| ITEM NO: | 44 |
| DISCOVERY DATE: | 12/01/83 |
| FACILITY STATUS CODE: | H |
| DESCRIPTION: | On 12/1/83, an inspection revealed two unsealed conduits penetrating the north wall of the passageway (common to both units) in the diesel fuel storage vault. A Report of Abnormal Condition (RAC) was written and the Unit 1 operations superintendent was informed. It was determined to be non-reportable for Unit 1; however, later review of the RAC indicated that further evaluation was warranted to determine applicability to Unit 2. Subsequently, it was determined to be reportable under Unit 2 Technical Specifications. |
| METHOD OF DISCOVERY: | C |
| DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: | Special fire barrier inspection |
| CAUSE CODE: | B |
| CAUSE: | The cause was inadequate work controls when dealing with fire barriers. The discrepancy could have resulted from inadequate controls during installation or incomplete restoration following maintenance. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: | A fire watch was established on 12/1/83. A job order was also issued to correct the deficiency. When work is completed, an inspection will be performed to verify the adequacy of the repair. |



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000

December 29, 1983




2CAN128313

Mr. J. E. Gagliardo, Director
Division of Resident Reactor Projects
and Engineering Programs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report
No. 83-045/03X-6

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b, attached is the subject report concerning deficient fire systems. This is a revision to a previous submittal dated December 20, 1983.

Very truly yours,

John R. Marshall
Manager, Licensing

JRM:RJS:rd

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

IE-22
11