

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:							1
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	S	C	V	C	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	13	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT		58

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5 7 1 1 1 2 8 3 8 1 2 2 7 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During a planned shutdown, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) 120 VAC
03 vital instrumentation panel APN-5901 was transferred to alternate power to
04 accommodate modifications to its normal power source. With Train "A" Residual
05 Heat Removal System in service, its suction valve XVG-8701A closed. The valve
06 was reopened within approximately five minutes. No adverse consequences resulted
07 due to plant conditions and the short duration of the event. The plant
08 remained in compliance with Technical Specifications during the event.

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
0	9	C	B	D	Z	I	N	S	T	R	U	P	Z				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
8		3		136		03		L		0							
21		22		23		24		25		26							
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
X	X	Z	Z	0000	Y	N	N	W120									
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26				

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A dead bus transfer from normal to alternate power source created a power
1 1 transient in the associated ESF instrumentation bus. Erroneous signals were
1 2 generated as a result of the transient. Conditions were returned to normal
1 3 after the transfer was completed. A power distribution list is to be generated
1 4 to inform operators of plant instrumentation power sources.

8 9
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 D (28) 0 0 0 (29) N/A A (31) Operator Observation

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) N/A N/A

47 48 49

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

1 7 0 0 0 (37) 2 (38) N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES (45)

8401050410 831227
PDR ADOCK 05000395
S PDR

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	000	40 N/A

7	8	9	10	11	12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					
TYPE					(43)
DESCRIPTION					
<div style="text-align: right;">IE22</div>					

1 9 Z 42 N/A

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 N (44) N/A

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

H. C. Fields

PHONE:

(803) 345-5209

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

04 JAN 3 12:31
December 27, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 83-136

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-136 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2, "Reactor Coolant System, Cold Shutdown - Loops Not Filled," on November 28, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

HCF:OWD/mac/fjc
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
T. C. Nichols, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr.
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E. C. Roberts
W. A. Williams, Jr.
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1E22

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
LER No. 83-136
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December 27, 1983

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

On November 28, 1983, the Plant was shutdown for post-steam generator modification eddy current testing. The Plant was in Mode 5 with Train "A" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in service.

A modification was scheduled to be performed on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) inverter, XIT-5901, while the Plant was shut down. XIT-5901 is the normal power source for APN-5901, a 120 VAC vital instrument power supply panel for ESF instrumentation. In order to perform the modification on the inverter, APN-5901 was transferred to its alternate power supply, APN-1FA.

Approximately five minutes had elapsed when the Operator at the Controls (OATC) noticed RCS temperature increasing. Upon checking the RHR valve line-up, the OATC discovered XVG-8701A, "RHR Suction Isolation Valve," from the RCS closed. The valve was immediately reopened to restore Train "A" RHR to service. RCS temperature reached 124°F maximum. XVG-8701A was reopened within approximately five minutes of its closure.

Due to plant conditions and the short duration of the event, there were no resulting adverse consequences. The loss of the Train "A" RHR System necessitated entry into Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2. Technical Specification compliance was maintained at all times.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Pressure transmitter, PT-403, receives loop power from APN-5901 via instrument power panel XPN-7001. PT-403 is the pressure instrument for XVG-8701A. In transferring APN-5901 from normal to alternate power supply, the ESF instrument bus powered by the power panel was momentarily de-energized which created a dead bus transfer. The power transient resulted in the spiking of PT-403 and subsequent closure of XVG-8701A.

This condition returned to normal operation upon completion of the electrical line-up.

An APN power distribution list will be generated by June 30, 1984, to enhance operator anticipation of plant instrumentation responses during transients of this type in the future.