LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT / 142 DELARONDE STREET
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MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

December 21, 1983

W3K83-2004
Q-3-A35.07

Mr. John T. Collins
Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

REFERENCE: Telecon C. Hooper (LP&L) and D. Hunnicut (NRC, Region IV) on November 15, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Potentially Reportable Deficiency No. 130
"Loss of Annulus Vacuum Control, Potential For"
Final Report

On November 15, 1983, a problem with the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS) motor operated valves was reported as Potentially Reportable Deficiency No. 130. Further evaluation of the previously described condition indicates this condition is not considered reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

EVALUATION

There is an interlock designed into SBVS that will prevent the SBVS fans (E-17 SA/SB) from starting if the filter train inlet or outlet isolation valves are closed. During preoperational testing on train A, this interlock was tested by closing the train inlet valve (2HV-B160A) and de-energizing the breaker to its motor operator. When the attempt was made to start the system, the breakers on the motor operators to the filter train outlet (2HV-B158A) and either the exhaust (2HV-B162A) or recirculating (2HV-B164A) valves tripped.

The above tests were thus conducted under an abnormal circumstance. That is, the inlet damper to the filter train was closed and de-energized. Under this configuration, that particular filter train would have been unavailable irrespective of the breakers on the other two valves tripping. The MOVs have operated properly when tested under normal circumstances, i.e., when opening was attempted without any valve de-energized. The fact that these valves tripped while in the abnormal configuration would not therefore have affected the SBVSs ability to respond on an SIAS.

IE-27

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Although the breaker sizes have been changed, as a result of the problem identified by this test, the original breaker sizes would not have adversely affected safety if left uncorrected and this PRD is therefore considered not reportable.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Gerrets

T. F. Gerrets
Quality Assurance Manager

TFG:CNH:SSTG

cc: Director
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