

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	0	H	D	R	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5				
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58			59

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REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6 7 0 7 2 5 8 3 8 1 2 2 9 8 3 9  
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

02 (NP-33-83-48) On 7/25/83 at 1440 hours, Auxiliary Feed Pump (AFP) 1-1 was declared  
03 inoperable due to the failure of the pump to respond to speed change signals from both  
04 automatic and manual control. It was observed that the speed changer motor was res-  
05 ponding to the signals, but the governor would not react since the clutch between the  
06 motor and governor was slipping. This occurrence placed the unit in Action Statement  
07 (a) of Tech Spec 3.7.1.2. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public  
08 or station personnel. AFP 1-2 was operable throughout this occurrence.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
		W	B	B		B		P	U	M	P	B		Z	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.					
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34				
1		8	3		0	4	0	/	0	1	3	X		1	
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
B				Z		Z		0	0	0	0	Y		Y	
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33

1 0 The apparent cause of this occurrence is a design deficiency in the clutch mechanism.

1 1 Maintenance personnel attempted to adjust the slip clutch for the governor under MWO

1 2 1-83-4007-00, but difficulty was experienced in setting the slip clutch at a consis-

1 3 tent value. Under FCR 83-095, a new design slip clutch was installed which eliminated

1 4 the metal to metal slipping face and provided a sacrificial carbon clutch.

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (2) E (28) % POWER (3) 0 (4) 7 (5) 0 (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A (31) Operator observation DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) 6 (2) Z (33) (3) Z (34) NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (1) 7 (2) 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (37) (5) 2 (38) NA DESCRIPTION (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (1) 5 (2) 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (40) NA DESCRIPTION (41) IE22S

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (1) 9 (2) Z (42) NA DESCRIPTION (43)

PUBLICITY ISSUED (1) 0 (2) 0 (3) N (44) NA DESCRIPTION (45)

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 PDR ADOCK 05000346  
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

DVR 83-090 NAME OF PREPARER Tim Thompson

PHONE: (419) 259-5000, Ext 252

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-48

DATE OF EVENT: July 25, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of speed control on Auxiliary Feed Pump (AFP) 1-1

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 2, with Power (MWt) = 0 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On July 25, 1983 at 1440 hours following a reactor trip, AFP 1-1 was declared inoperable due to its failure to respond to speed changes from both automatic and manual control. It was observed that the speed changer motor was responding to the signals, but the governor would not react since the clutch between the motor and governor was slipping. This occurrence placed the unit in Action State-ment (a) of Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, which requires restoration of the inoperable system within 72 hours or be in Hot Standby within the next 12 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this occurrence is a design deficiency in the clutch mechanism.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. AFP 1-2 was operable throughout this occurrence. In addition, the startup feed pump was in operation at the time AFP 1-1 became inoperable, therefore, the loss of the AFP had no effect on the post trip response.

Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Order 1-83-4007-00, Maintenance personnel attempted to adjust the slip clutch for the governor, but difficulty was experienced in setting the clutch to slip at a consistent value.

The unit was not restarted, and the 1983 Refueling Outage was commenced. Under Facility Change Request 83-095, a new design slip clutch was installed which eliminated the metal to metal slipping face and provided a sacrificial carbon clutch. During the 1983 Refueling Outage, both governors were sent to the manufacturer for modifications. As a result, the speed changer motor was doweled to a mounting block, and welded to the governor case to limit misalignment between the governor shaft and motor shaft. Also, a flexible (universal) coupling was installed to eliminate side loading of the clutch.

On September 25, 1983 at 1930 hours, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 was declared operable after the successful completion of ST 5071.01, Auxiliary Feedwater System Monthly Test.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-48  
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Failure Data: Previous similar occurrences involving the inoperability of auxiliary feedwater pumps due to defective governors were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-81-44 (81-037) and NP-33-81-57 (81-045).

LER #83-040



December 29, 1983

Log No. K83-1770  
File: RR 2 (NP-33-83-48)

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Administrator, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Enclosed are three copies of Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 83-040, including revised supplemental information sheets. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page

Please destroy your previous copies of this report and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

*Terry D. Murray /smg*

Terry D. Murray  
Station Superintendent  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director  
Office of Management and Program Analysis  
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Encl: 1 copy