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CLASS I
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**GENERAL ELECTRIC BOILING WATER
REACTOR SUPPLEMENTAL RELOAD
LICENSING SUBMITTAL FOR
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
UNIT 1, RELOAD 6**

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GENERAL ELECTRIC BOILING WATER REACTOR
SUPPLEMENTAL RELOAD LICENSING SUBMITTAL

FOR

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1
RELOAD 6

Prepared: P. A. Verbryke
P. A. Verbryke

Verified: C. L. Hilf
C. L. Hilf

Approved: J. S. Charnley
J. S. Charnley, Manager
Fuel Licensing

NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION • GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125

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CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT
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1. PLANT UNIQUE ITEMS (1.0)*

Increased Core Flow Throughout Cycle:	Appendix A
Bounding Control Rod Drop Accident Analysis:	Appendix B
Safety/Relief Valve Low Setpoint:	Appendix C

2. RELOAD FUEL BUNDLES (1.0, 2.7, 3.3.1 AND 4.0)

	<u>Fuel Designation</u>	<u>Cycle Loaded</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Drilled</u>
Irradiated	8DB219L	4	24	24
	8DB219H	4	8	8
	P8DRB265L	5	120	120
	P8DRB282	5	64	64
	P8DRB265H	6	60	60
	P8DRB282	6	112	112
New	P8DRB282	7	160	160
	BP8DRB282	7	32	32
Total			580	580

3. REFERENCE CORE LOADING PATTERN (3.3.1)

Nominal previous cycle core average exposure at end of cycle:	16474 MWd/ST
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Minimum previous cycle core average exposure at end of cycle from cold shutdown considerations:	16074 MWd/ST
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Assumed reload cycle core average exposure at end of cycle:	18070 MWd/ST
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Core loading pattern:	Figure 1
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*() refers to areas of discussion in "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," NEDE-24011-P-A-6 and NEDO-24011-P-A-6-US.

4. CALCULATED CORE EFFECTIVE MULTIPLICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM WORTH -
NO VOIDS, 20°C (3.3.2.1.1 AND 3.3.2.1.2)

Minimum Shutdown Margin, BOC, k_{eff}	
Uncontrolled	1.113
Fully Controlled	0.955
Strongest Control Rod Out	0.983
R, Maximum Increase in Cold Core Reactivity with Exposure into Cycle, Δk	0.007

5. STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY (3.3.2.1.3)

<u>ppm</u>	<u>Shutdown Margin (Δk) (20°C, Xenon Free)</u>
700	0.048

6. RELOAD-UNIQUE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS INPUT (3.3.2.1.5 AND S.2.2)

(REDY Events Only)

	<u>BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST</u>	<u>EOC7</u>
Void Fraction (%)	35.7	35.7
Average Fuel Temperature (°F)	1150	1150
Void Coefficient N/A* (¢/% Rg)	-6.43/-8.04	-5.65/-7.07
Doppler Coefficient N/A (¢/°F)	-0.216/-0.205	-0.228/-0.217
Scram Worth N/A (\$) **		

*N = Nuclear Input Data, A = Used in Transient Analysis

**Generic, exposure independent values are used as given in "General Electric Application for Reactor Fuel," NEDE-24011-P-A-6-US.

7. RELOAD-UNIQUE GETAB TRANSIENT ANALYSIS INITIAL CONDITION PARAMETER (S.2.2)

<u>Fuel Design</u>	<u>Peaking Factors</u> <u>(Local, Radial, Axial)</u>			<u>R-Factor</u>	<u>Bundle Power</u> <u>(MWt)</u>	<u>Bundle Flow</u> <u>(1000 lb/hr)</u>	<u>Initial</u> <u>MCPR</u>
<u>BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST</u>							
BP8x8R/ P8x8R	1.20	1.73	1.40	1.051	5.836	106.2	1.34
8x8	1.22	1.63	1.40	1.098	5.480	105.5	1.30
<u>EOC7</u>							
BP8x8R/ P8x8R	1.20	1.67	1.40	1.051	5.634	107.4	1.39
8x8	1.22	1.56	1.40	1.098	5.246	107.1	1.37

8. SELECTED MARGIN IMPROVEMENT OPTIONS (S.2.2.2)

Transient Recategorization:	No
Recirculation Pump Trip:	No
Rod Withdrawal Limiter:	No
Thermal Power Monitor:	No
Measured Scram Time:	No
Number of Exposure Points:	2

9. OPERATING FLEXIBILITY OPTIONS

Single Loop Operation:	No
Load Line Limit:	No
Extended Load Line Limit:	Yes
Increased Core Flow:	Yes
Flow Point Analyzed:	107.5%
Feedwater Temperature Reduction:	No

10. CORE-WIDE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS RESULTS (S.2.2.1)

<u>Transient</u>	<u>Flux (% NBR)</u>	<u>Q/A (% NBR)</u>	<u>ΔCPR</u>		<u>Figure</u>
			<u>BP8x8R/ P8x8R</u>	<u>8x8</u>	
Exposure: BOC7 to BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST					
Load Rejection Without Bypass	527	121	0.27	0.23	2a
Feedwater Controller Failure	318	121	0.22	0.20	3a
Exposure: BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST to EOC7					
Load Rejection Without Bypass	580	124	0.32	0.30	2b
Feedwater Controller Failure	336	124	0.28	0.26	3b
Exposure: BOC7 to EOC7					
Inadvertent Startup of HPCI	121	114	0.13	0.13	4

11. LOCAL ROD WITHDRAWAL ERROR (WITH LIMITING INSTRUMENT FAILURE)
TRANSIENT SUMMARY (S.2.2.1)

(Generic Bounding Analysis Results)

<u>Rod Block Reading (%)</u>	<u>ΔCPR (All Fuel Types)</u>
104.	0.13
105.	0.16
106.	0.19
107.	0.22
108.	0.28
109.	0.32
110.	0.36

Setpoint Selected is: 107.

12. CYCLE MCPR VALUES (S.2.2)

Nonpressurization Events:

Exposure Range: BOC7 to EOC7

	<u>BP8x8R/ P8x8R</u>	<u>8x8</u>
Inadvertent Startup of HPCI	1.20*	1.20*
Fuel Loading Error	1.24	----
Rod Withdrawal Error	1.29	1.29

Pressurization Events:

	<u>Option A</u>		<u>Option B</u>	
	<u>BP8x8R/ P8x8R</u>	<u>8x8</u>	<u>BP8x8R/ P8x8R</u>	<u>8x8</u>
Exposure Range: BOC7 to BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST				
Load Rejection Without Bypass	1.40	1.36		
Feedwater Controller Failure	1.35	1.33		
Exposure Range: BOC7 + 6000 MWd/ST to EOC7				
Load Rejection Without Bypass	1.45	1.43	1.40	1.38
Feedwater Controller Failure	1.41	1.39	1.32	1.30

13. OVERPRESSURIZATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY (S.2.3)

<u>Transient</u>	<u>P_{sl} (psig)</u>	<u>P_v (psig)</u>	<u>Plant Response</u>
MSIV Closure (Flux Scram)	1315	1330	Figure 5

*The minimum MCPR value required by the ECCS analysis is 1.24.

14. STABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS (S.2.4)

Rod Line Analyzed: Extrapolated Rod Block

Decay Ratio:

Figure 6

Reactor Core Stability Decay Ratio, x_2/x_0 :

0.65

Channel Hydrodynamic Performance Decay Ratio, x_2/x_0

8x8 Channel:

0.23

BP8x8R/P8x8R Channel:

0.18

15. LOADING ERROR RESULTS (S.2.5.4)

Variable Water Gap Misoriented Bundle Analysis: Yes


<u>Event</u>	<u>Initial MCPR</u>	<u>Resulting MCPR</u>
Misoriented	1.22	1.07

16. CONTROL ROD DROP ANALYSIS RESULTS (S.2.5.1)

See Appendix B.

17. LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT RESULTS, NEW FUEL (S.2.5.2)

See "Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Report for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station," August 1977, NEDO-21696, as amended.



FUEL TYPE	
A = 8DB219L	E = P8DRB265H
B = 8DB219H	F = P8DRB282
C = P8DRB265L	G = P8DRB282
D = P8DRB282	H = BP8DRB282

Figure 1. Reference Core Loading Pattern




Figure 2a. Plant Response to Load Rejection Without Bypass,
100% Power, 107.5% Flow at BOC + 6000 MWd/ST




Figure 2b. Plant Response to Load Rejection Without Bypass,
100% Power, 107.5% Flow at EOC







Figure 3a. Plant Response to Feedwater Controller Failure,
100% Power, 107.5% Flow at BOC + 6000 MWd/ST




Figure 3b. Plant Response to Feedwater Controller Failure,
100% Power, 107.5% Flow at EOC







Figure 4. Plant Response to Inadvertent Start Up of HPCI Pump, 100% Power, 107.5% Flow at EOC







Figure 5. Plant Response to MSIV Closure, 100% Power, 107.5% Flow




Figure 6. Reactor Core Decay Ratio

APPENDIX A
INCREASE CORE FLOW THROUGHOUT CYCLE

The analyses performed for Cycle 7 included increased core flow throughout the cycle. There are no concerns regarding reactor internals pressure drop or flow-induced vibration as discussed in the increased core flow analysis document for the EOC-6 (NEDO-30242).

The flow-biased instrumentation for the rod block monitor should be signal clipped for a setpoint of 107%, since flow rates higher than rated would otherwise result in a Δ CPR higher than reported for the rod withdrawal error.

APPENDIX B
CONTROL ROD DROP ANALYSIS

The cycle-specific control rod drop accident analysis has been discontinued for banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) plants based on the fact that in all cases the peak fuel enthalpy from a control rod drop accident would be much less than the 280 cal/gm limit. This change in procedures was reported and justified in Reference B-1. Reference B-2 indicates this change is acceptable to the NRC.

REFERENCES

- B-1. Letter, R. E. Engel (GE) to D. B. Vassallo (NRC), "Control Rod Drop Accident," February 24, 1982.
- B-2. NRC Memo, L. S. Rubenstein to G. C. Lainas, "Changes in GE Analysis of the Control Rod Drop Accident for Plant Reloads (TACS-48058)," February 15, 1983.

APPENDIX C

SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE LOW SETPOINT

The value used in the transient analyses for the safety/relief valve low setpoint is 1126 psig. This is not consistent with the value of 1106 psig reported in NEDO-24011-P-A-6-US.

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