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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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17 LER RO
REPORT
NUMBER

EVENT YEAR
83

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061



OCCURRENCE	
CODE	
0	3
22	22

REPORT
TYPE
[L]
32

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22

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		
G	18	X	19	B	Z	0000	Y	N	Z	9	9	9
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	47		

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)772.

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NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Rupp

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PDR ADDCK 05000272
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NRC USE ONLY

PHONE: (609) 339-4309



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

December 30, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-061/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-061/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

JR:k11 *JKJ*

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-061/03L
Report Date: 12-30-83
Occurrence Date: 12-09-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
Instrumentation - Surveillance Testing - Not Completed Within the Time
Interval Specified

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-225.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1145 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0928 hours, December 9, 1983, during routine power operation, Technical Specification Action Statements 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 were entered and surveillance testing of Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train B commenced. The Safety Injection input from SSPS and the automatic actuation logic for Safety Injection, Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation was not completed within the one (1) hour interval allowed for testing by Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1.1 Action 1 and 3.3.2.1 Action 13. In accordance with the action requirements, a unit load reduction was commenced at 1028 hours to place the plant in hot standby within 6 hours. Surveillance testing was satisfactorily completed at 1113 hours. At this time, Action Statements 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 were terminated and the Control Operator commenced increasing reactor power. Reactor power was at 98% at 1129 hours.

A similar occurrence on September 16, 1983, involving Reactor Trip Breaker surveillance exceeding the one (1) hour time limit, was documented in LER 83-040/03L.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The delay involved in this particular occurrence resulted from a typographical error in the procedure. This was the first time the procedure had been performed since it had been recently retyped. The on-the-spot change that was required, so that the procedure could be continued and completed satisfactorily, resulted in exceeding the allotted time requirement. Experience has shown the Technical Specification one hour time requirement in the limiting conditions for operation to be somewhat restrictive. Any delays in the performance of the surveillance procedures can result in not meeting the one hour requirement. Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

allows two (2) hours for such testing; this time interval has proven to be a more workable limit on the time a channel may be bypassed for testing.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Systems and their associated instrumentation and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated action will be initiated when the parameter monitored by the channel exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit testing and maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for actuation system purposes from diverse parameters.

The operability of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1.1 Action 1 and 3.3.2.1 Action 13 state:

With the number of channels operable one less than required by the minimum number of channels operable requirement, or one less than the total number of channels, be in hot standby within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to one hour for surveillance testing per Specifications 4.3.1.1.1 and 4.3.2.1.1 (channel check, channel calibration and channel functional test).

As noted, unit load reduction was commenced and surveillance testing was completed within the six hour interval specified by the action requirements. One channel was bypassed for testing in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the redundant channels were operable throughout the occurrence, providing protection from the redundant protection train. The event therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. Due to the loss of redundancy involved, the occurrence constituted operation in degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Surveillance testing was satisfactorily completed at 1113 hours, December 9, 1983, and Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.1.1 Action 1 and 3.3.2.1 Action 13 were terminated. In order to standardize the Technical Specification requirements between the two units and to allow sufficient time for adequate completion of the surveillance, License Change Request 83-17 is in the process of being submitted to the NRC to extend the Unit 1 time interval to 2 hours (as allowed for Unit 2 testing).


LER 83-061/03L

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FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicab^l.

Prepared By J. Rupp



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-154