

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 S C H B R 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
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CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 1 1 0 4 8 3 8 0 1 0 5 8 4 9  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 On November 4, 1983, at 0130 hours, with the unit at 0% power, during testing of the

0 3 pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV), valve PORV-456 failed to meet the

0 4 required cycle time. The low temperature overpressure protection system (LTOP) was

0 5 placed in service at 0200 hours on November 4, 1983. This resulted in a degraded

0 6 mode permitted by Tech. Spec. 3.1.2.1.d and is reported pursuant to Tech. Spec.

0 7 6.9.2.b.2. The redundant PORV was operable; thus there was no threat to the public

0 8 health and safety. The reportability of this item was not recognized until

0 9 December 6, 1983.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE S H 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14 COMP. SUBCODE H 15 VALVE SUBCODE B 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 0 3 2 0 3 0 3 L 0

ACTION TAKEN B 18 X 19 FUTURE ACTION Z 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD 0 0 0 0 22 HOURS Y 23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 6 3 5 26

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 While the unit was in cold shutdown, the limit switch on PORV-456 was adjusted, and a

1 1 small air leak was repaired on the operating diaphragm. PORV-456 was then successfully

1 2 tested. The probable cause of not meeting the required cycle time was the limit

1 3 switch needing adjustment.

1 4 FACILITY STATUS G 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance Test 32

1 5 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

1 6 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 0 0 0 37 Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

1 7 PERSONNEL INJURIES 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

1 8 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

1 9 PUBLICITY N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45

2 0 ISSUED N 46

8401130132 840105  
PDR ADOCK 05000261  
S PDR

IE22

NAME OF PREPARER Carson L. Wright

NRC USE ONLY  
PHONE: 803-383-4524

Supplemental Information  
For  
LER-83-032

I. Cause, Description and Analysis

On November 4, 1983 at 0130 hours, with the unit at 0% power, during testing of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV), valve PCV-456 failed to meet the required cycle time. At 0200, the low temperature overpressure protection system (LTOP) was placed in service. The LTOP system used both PORVs. This resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by the LCO of Technical Specification 3.1.2.1.d and is reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.2. The redundant PORV was operable; thus there was no threat to the public health and safety.

II. Corrective Action

The limit switch on PCV-456 was adjusted. A small leak on the operating diaphragm was repaired, and the valves were successfully tested while the unit was in cold shutdown. The apparent cause for the valve not meeting its cycle time was the misadjustment of the limit switch. The diaphragm leak was very small and would probably not have extended the cycle time.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

No additional action is considered necessary. The PORVs are tested with their block valve shut so system pressure is not under the valve during testing. The valve should operate well within the two (2) second requirement if needed to relieve pressure.



Carolina Power & Light Company

Company Correspondence

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT  
POST OFFICE BOX 790  
HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA 29550  
January 5, 1984

Robinson File No: 13510C

Serial: RSEP/84-10

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-261  
LICENSE NO. DPR-23  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-032

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.2 of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirements for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July, 1977.

Very truly yours,

R. E. Morgan  
General Manager  
H. B. Robinson SEG Plant

CLW:FMG/th

Enclosure

cc: R. C. DeYoung (30)  
R. A. Hartfield (3)  
INPO (1)

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