

APPROVED BY OMB
3150-0011

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

07 | no danger to the health and safety of the public.

0	8	
7	8	9

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
X	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	Z	25
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 3 connection was restored and unit 2 was removed from the LCO in 3 days. No

1 4 corrective action or recurrence control are planned at this time.

6 7 8 9 10 11 NA 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NA 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	(41)

1 8 0 0 0 40 NA 1000

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)	8401120309 840106 PDR ADOCK 05000260
TYPE	DESCRIPTION		
1	2		
3	4		

9 2 3 NA S PDR

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

PHONE (205) 729 0885

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83078 Technical Specification Involved 3.5.B.13

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.B(2) * Date Due NRC 1/6/84

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were in refueling outages and unit 2 was operating normally at 99% power. The unit 3 RHR pumps were removed from service for maintenance on 11/16/83. This resulted in a loss of RHR crosstie connection between units 2 and 3. Then on 12/7/83, the B and D RHR pumps in unit 1 were removed from service to allow isolating valve 1-FCV-74-66 for maintenance. This resulted in a loss of the RHR crosstie connection between units 1 and 2 and placed unit 2 in a 10-day LCO (T.S. 3.5.B.13). The RHR crosstie connection between units 1 and 2 was returned to service on 12/10/83 after completing the repairs to valve 1-FCV-74-66. Unit 2 was removed from the LCO in 3 days; therefore, no corrective action or recurrence control are planned at this time. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-260/81031

BFRO-50-260/81034

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 5, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83078

The enclosed report provides details concerning removal of residual heat
removal cross-tie connection for unit 2 to facilitate maintenance of
valve 1-FCV-74-66. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns
Ferry unit 2 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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