

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)0 1 C A S O S 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

CONT

0 1 L 6 0 5 0 0 3 6 2 7 1 1 2 4 8 3 8 1 2 2 3 8 3 9  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On 11/24/83, at 1120, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, Train A Containment Emer-

0 3 gency Cooling Unit 3E-401 was rendered inoperable when its Component

0 4 Cooling Water Outlet Valve 3HV-6367 failed to open fully, entering LCO

0 5 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a'. However, since Train B Diesel Generator

0 6 3G003 was inoperable at this time (reference LER 83-083), with 3E-401 in-

0 7 operable, the more restrictive requirements of LCO 3.8.1.1, Action

0 8 Statement 'c.1' were invoked. Public health and safety were unaffected.

0 9 S B 11 E 12 B 13 V A L V E X 14 E 15 D 16  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39(17) LER NO. REPORT NUMBER  
8 3SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.  
1 0 7OCCURRENCE CODE  
0 3REPORT TYPE  
LREVISION NO.  
0ACTION TAKEN  
E 18 X 19FUTURE ACTION  
Z 20EFFECT ON PLANT  
Z 21SHUTDOWN METHOD  
Z 22HOURS  
0 0 0 0ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED  
N 23NPRD-4 FORM SUB.  
N 24PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER  
A 25COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
W 2 5 5

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The torque switch for 3HV-6367 opened prematurely. The valve stem was

1 1 lubricated and the torque setting was adjusted. 3HV-6367 was tested in

1 2 accordance with Procedure S023-3-3.20 and 3E-401 was returned to service

1 3 on 11/24/83, at 1300. An investigation into the cause of this and simi-

1 4 lar failures is in progress. See also LER 83-137, Docket No. 50-361.

1 5 B 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 A 31 Operator Observation 32  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 391 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 391 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 391 8 0 0 0 40 NA 41  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 391 9 Z 42 NA 43  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 392 0 N 44 NA 45  
7 8 9 14 15 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

NAME OF PREPARER

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*Southern California Edison Company*

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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672 REGION V

J. G. HAYNES  
STATION MANAGER

December 23, 1983

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region V  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-362  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 83-107  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-15 for San Onofre Unit 3, this submittal provides the required 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) form for an occurrence involving Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) 3.6.2.3 and 3.8.1.1, associated with the Containment Cooling Systems, and the Electrical Power Systems, respectively.

On November 24, 1983, at 1120, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, Train A Containment Emergency Cooling Unit 3E-401 was rendered inoperable when its Component Cooling Water (CCW) Outlet Valve 3HV-6367 failed to open fully, causing entry into LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a'. However, since Train B Diesel Generator 3G003 was inoperable at this time (reference LER 83-083), Action Statement 'c.1' of LCO 3.8.1.1 was also entered. The requirements of Action Statement 'c.1' are more restrictive than that of LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a', and, therefore, LCO 3.8.1.1, Action Statement 'c.1' was invoked.

The inoperability of 3E-401 was due to the premature opening of the torque switch for 3HV-6367, preventing this valve from opening fully. The valve stem was lubricated and the torque switch setting was adjusted. 3HV-6367 was stroke tested satisfactorily in accordance with Procedure SO23-3-3.20 and 3E-401 was returned to service on November 24, 1983, at 1300, within the time limits of LCO 3.8.1.1.

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1/1

December 23, 1983

Similar occurrences of valves failing to open fully were previously reported in LER 83-137 (Docket No. 50-361). This event will be included in the investigation identified in LER 83-137, which is in progress to determine the root cause of these failures. There was no impact on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public associated with this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

*J. E. Haynes/HBL*

Enclosure: LER No. 83-107

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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