

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

UPDATE REPORT

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 09/09/78

CONTROL BLOCK: 

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

 ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G	A	E	I	H	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 8 2 5 7 8 8 1 2 2 7 8 3 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On 08/25/78 while reviewing QA Fire Protection Audits and HNP Fire Protection Evaluations, personnel noted that no fire penetration seals were installed in two mech. penetrations in the floor of the oil cond. room and also, one penetration on the wall of the 600v switchgear room 2D violating T.S. 3/4.7.7.a. Smoke detectors and sprinklers were available and would have given sufficient warning for safe plant shutdown. This event is considered reportable per 10CFR21.

0 9		SYSTEM CODE A B		CAUSE CODE B		CAUSE SUBCODE C		COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z						COMP. SUBCODE Z		VALVE SUBCODE Z	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 8		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 6		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE X		REVISION NO. 1							
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38		
ACTION TAKEN C		FUTURE ACTION Z		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L			
39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54		
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9																	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The seals were missing because it was thought to be unnecessary to  
1 1 install them during the initial installation period. The penetrations  
1 2 were sealed and the requirements of Tech. Specs. concerning fire watches  
1 3 was emphasized to those concerned. This event has been evaluated to be  
1 4 reportable per 10CFR21.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

FACILITY STATUS      % POWER      OTHER STATUS (30)      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 B (28) 0 0 0 (29) NA C (31) QA Audit & Fire Evaluation Review

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 9 Z 33 34 11

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
1	8	0	0
0	0	0	0
40		NA	

8401040415 831227

8		9		11		12		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY						(43)		
TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	9	Z	(42)			NA		

8401080415 851227  
 PDR ADDCK 05000366  
 S PDR

7	8	9	10											80											
			PUBLCITY																						
			ISSUED	DESCRIPTION	(45)																				
2	0		N	(44)	NA																				
7	8	9	10																						
NRC USE ONLY																									
<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td> </tr> </table>																									
7	8	9	10																						

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-366/1978-026, Rev. 1  
UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 09/09/78

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3/4.7.7.a.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The mode selector switch was in "Shutdown" and reactor power was at 0 Mwt (0% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

During a review of QA Fire Protection Audits and the HNP Fire Protection Evaluation, it was discovered on 08/25/78 at approximately 1553 CST that no rated fire penetration seals were installed in two mechanical penetrations in the floor of the oil conditioning room and in one penetratin on the wall of 600 volt switchgear room 2D which violated Tech. Specs. 3/4.7.7.a.

The evaluation for 10CFR21 reportability was completed December 27, 1983. The evaluation determined this event to be reportable under 10CFR21 requirements.

Consequences of the event(s):

The safe operation of the plant was not affected. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This event has been found to be reportable under Title 10CFR21.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There are no redundant subsystems for penetration seals.

Justification for continued operation:

Smoke detection and sprinkler systems which cover these areas were available and would have given sufficient warning for safe plant shutdown. The unit was shutdown at the time of this event.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is non-repetitive.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

Both units have similar systems. The number and location of these components are described in the "Detailed description of the event" section of this narrative. The Unit 1 seals were adequately installed at the time of this event. A fire in the oil conditioning room, combined with an independent single failure in the 600v switchgear room 2C would result in the loss of both 600v switchgear rooms. This would cause a loss of safety function necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The contractor responsible for installing these seals on mechanical penetrations was Pullman Power Company.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

These mechanical penetration seals were evidently deemed unnecessary at initial installation by the contractor (Pullman Power Company) because of a misunderstanding stemming from the great emphasis placed on electrical fire penetration seals. Also, it was not recognized to initiate a fire watch for the switch gear room penetration due to a misunderstanding of Unit 2 Tech. Specs.

Immediate Corrective Action:

All these mechanical penetrations had fire protection seals properly installed. Those concerned were instructed on the fire watch requirements as stated in the Unit 2 Tech. Specs.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No further action is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No further action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

The corrective action taken should be sufficient to preclude recurrence.

Georgia Power Company  
Post Office Box 439  
Baxley, Georgia 31513  
Telephone 912 367-7781  
912 537-9444



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant JAN 4 All: 16


December 27, 1983  
GM-83-1214

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1978-026, Rev. 1. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.c. This revision is made due to the determination that this event is reportable under 10CFR21 requirements.

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

HCN/SBT/djs

xc: R. J. Kelly  
G. F. Head  
J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
P. D. Rice  
K. M. Gillespie  
S. B. Tipps  
R. D. Baker  
Control Room  
Document Control

OFFICIAL COPY

JE22  
1/1