

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 1 1 2 2 8 3 8 1 2 2 1 8 3 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit at 100% power, while performing periodic testing on the containment
0 3 spray pump 2-CS-P-1A, the pump motor tripped while attempting to start. Subsequently,
0 4 in an attempt to prove the operability of pump 2-CS-P-1B, the pump motor tripped while
0 5 attempting to start. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.A.1 and
0 6 reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Since both containment spray subsystems were proven
0 7 operable and returned to service within the time required by T.S., the health and
0 8 safety of the public were not affected.

09		SYSTEM CODE S B		11	CAUSE CODE D		12	CAUSE SUBCODE Z						13	COMPONENT CODE C K T B R K						14	COMP. SUBCODE A		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16		
7	8	9	10		11		12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20														
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 3		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 6		24	25	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28	29	REPORT TYPE L		30	REVISION NO. 0		32							
33		ACTION TAKEN E		FUTURE ACTION X		34	35	EFFECT ON PLANT Z		36	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		37	38	39	40	HOURS 0 0 0 0		42	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		43	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y		44	45	46	47	
33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Premature breaker trips are believed to have been caused by instantaneous delay trip

1 1 | times being set lower than .07 seconds. The instantaneous breaker trip settings

1 2 | were set to the optimum value of .07 seconds.

1 3 |

1 4 |

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	E	28	1	0	0	29	N/A	B
ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A	N/A		
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION			
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A	
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION					
1	8	0	0	0	40			N/A	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	42					N/A	
PUBLICITY ISSUED		DESCRIPTION							
2	0	N	44					N/A	

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PDR ADOCK 05000281
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 83-056/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 11-22-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: 2-CS-P-1A & 1B BREAKERS TRIPPED

1. Description of the Event

With the unit at 100% power, while performing periodic testing on the containment spray pump 2-CS-P-1A, the pump motor tripped while attempting to start. Subsequently, in an attempt to prove the operability of pump 2-CS-P-1B, the pump motor tripped while attempting to start. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.A.1 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The spray systems in each reactor unit consist of two separate parallel containment spray subsystems, each of 100 percent capacity. Both containment spray subsystems were proven operable and returned to service within the time required by Technical Specifications therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

Following the breaker trips on 11-22-83, both containment spray pump motor breakers instantaneous delay trip times were discovered to be set lower than the optimum setting of .07 seconds. Premature breaker trips are believed to have been caused by instantaneous delay trip times being set lower than .07 seconds as permitted by the breaker maintenance history cards.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

Upon receiving a trip on pump 2-CS-P-1B, the motor was bridged and meggered satisfactorily. The instantaneous delay trip times for breakers controlling pumps 2-CS-P-1A and 1B were set to the optimum value of .07 seconds. The pumps were then tested satisfactorily and returned to operable status.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The instantaneous delay trip settings for the inside and outside recirculation spray pump motor breakers and the low head safety injection pump motor breakers were tested and set to the optimum value of .07 seconds.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The following actions will be implemented:

- 1) Documented breaker trip settings will be obtained from the Architect Engineer.
- 2) Motor Data and curves will be secured from the Nuclear Steam supplier.

- 3) Vepco's automation and control group will be tasked with calculating and reviewing 480 volt breaker settings based on data received from the Nuclear Steam Supplier.
- 4) Safety related breakers settings will be documented and subject to formal review as a setpoint change.

7. Generic Implications

A review of past deviation reports revealed that unit 1 breakers have not experienced premature instantaneous delay trips. Unit 1 breakers will be tested to insure the trip points are set to optimum values. This work will be performed in concert with the regularly scheduled Periodic Testing Program.