

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 G A E I H 2 200-000000-000 341111 4 5  
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
01 L 605000366 7120883 8122283 9  
7 8 9 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 During a performance of the "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TEST"  
03 procedure (HNP-2-3006), the 2C71-K3D relay failed to de-energize when  
04 the main steam line isolation valve 2B21-F028D was being tested. The  
05 plant was unable to meet the requirements of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.1-1,  
06 Item 5. The inoperable trip channel was tripped per the requirement of  
07 Tech. Specs. section 3.3.1, ACTION a. The health and safety of the  
08 public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.  
7 8 9 80

09 C D 11 E 12 A 13 X X X X X X 14 Z 15 Z 16  
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 13 COMPONENT CODE 13 18 COMP. SUBCODE 19 20 VALVE SUBCODE 20 21

17 83 1 4 1 0 3 L 0  
7 8 9 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 EVENT YEAR 23 24 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 25 26 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 28 REPORT TYPE 29 30 REVISION NO. 31 32

D 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0000 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 N007 26  
33 34 ACTION TAKEN 35 36 FUTURE ACTION 37 38 EFFECT ON PLANT 39 40 SHUTDOWN METHOD 41 42 HOURS 43 44 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 45 46 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 47 48 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 49 50 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 51 52

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The cause of this event was attributed to a corroded limit switch which  
11 failed to allow the 2C71-K3D relay to de-energize properly. The  
12 corroded limit switch that is mounted on the side of 2B21-F028D was  
13 cleaned and returned to service. The "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL  
14 TEST" procedure was completed successfully on 12/13/83.  
7 8 9 80

15 E 28 100 29 NA B 31 Surveillance Testing  
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 11 % POWER 12 13 OTHER STATUS 30 31 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 32 33 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 34 35

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA  
7 8 9 RELEASED OF RELEASE 35 36 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 37 38 LOCATION OF RELEASE 39 40

17 000 37 Z 38 NA  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 39 40 TYPE 41 42 DESCRIPTION 43 44

18 000 40 NA  
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 41 42 DESCRIPTION 43 44

19 Z 42 NA  
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 43 44 DESCRIPTION 45 46

20 N 44 NA  
7 8 9 PUBLICITY ISSUED 45 46 DESCRIPTION 47 48

8401040250 831222  
PDR ADOCK 05000366  
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE (912)367-7851  
7 8 9 80 NRC USE ONLY 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-366/1983-141

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.1-1, Item 5.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On 12/08/83, the plant was in steady-state operation at 2436 MWt (approximately 100% reactor power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

During the performance of the "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TEST" procedure (HNP-2-3006), the 2C71-K3D relay failed to de-energize when the main steam line isolation valve 2B21-F028D was being tested. The 2C71-K3D was declared inoperable. Thus, the plant was unable to meet the "MINIMUM NUMBER OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM" requirement of Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.1-1, Item 5.

Consequences of the event(s):

The plant remained in steady-state operation with the 2C71-K3D relay trip system in its tripped condition. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

All the remaining steam line isolation valve trip channels were operable at the time of this event and remained operable throughout this event.

Justification for continued operation:

The inoperable trip channel was placed in the tripped condition within one hour per the requirement of Tech. Specs. section 3.3.1, ACTION a.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1983-141  
Page Two

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

There was no impact to other plant systems or to the other unit.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event was attributed to a corroded limit switch (i.e., mounted on the side of 2B21-F028D) which failed to allow the 2C71-K3D relay to de-energize. The corrosion of this limit switch was possibly due to steam leaks in the area.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The corroded limit switch was cleared and returned to service. The "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TEST" procedure was successfully completed for 2B21-F028D on 12/13/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

There is no supplemental corrective action required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

There is no scheduled corrective action required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company  
Post Office Box 439  
Baxley, Georgia 31513  
Telephone 912 367-7781  
912 537-9444



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


December 22, 1983  
GM-83-1219

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-141. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

*JCE*  
HCN/SBT/djs

xc: R. J. Kelly  
G. F. Head  
J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
P. D. Rice  
K. M. Gillespie  
S. B. Tipps  
R. D. Baker  
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Document Control

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