

EXHIBIT A

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO.: 50-302/83-050/03L-0

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3

REPORT DATE: December 22, 1983

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 17, 1983

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Ascended from Mode 5 to Mode 4 on July 17, 1983, prior to completing all applicable surveillances as required by Technical Specification 4.0.4.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Startup from Refueling Outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On November 4, 1983, a Florida Power Corporation (FPC) Quality Program Audit identified that mode ascension occurred (Mode 5 to Mode 4) on July 17, 1983, prior to completing surveillance testing of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System and the testing of components which respond to Engineered Safeguards (ES) Actuation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Although testing was not completed in Mode 5, the tests were completed satisfactorily upon entry into Mode 4. Therefore, in all probability, the LPI system and the ES components were capable of performing their intended function, prior to, and upon entry into Mode 4.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The Surveillance Procedure, SP-358, ES Monthly Automatic Functional Tests, and Surveillance Procedure SP-417, Refueling Interval Integrated Plant Response to Engineered Safeguards Actuation, as presently written, cannot be performed in their entirety during Mode 5.

Procedure SP-417 causes the HPI safety injection system to inject water into the RCS. In Mode 5, the temperature of the reactor vessel is below an acceptable NDT_T temperature for injection of HPI water. This concern is based on a postulated over-pressurization at low temperatures.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

SP-358 and SP-417 were completed satisfactorily on July 19, 1983, after ascending to Mode 4.


A revision to these procedures will be made to allow them to be performed, in total, during Mode 5 conditions.

SP-440, Unit Startup Surveillance Plan will be revised to require performance of these SP's prior to ascending to Mode 4.

In addition, Florida Power Corporation is evaluating the feasibility of testing Low Pressure and High Pressure Injection Systems under Mode 5 conditions.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the first occurrence of this type and the third event reported under Technical Specification 3.0.4.



DEC 29 8:59

**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

December 22, 1983
3F1283-27

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 83-050

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 83-050 and the attached supplementary information sheet, which are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(c). This report has been delayed as was indicated in our letter dated December 5, 1983.

Sincerely,

P. Y. Baynard
P. Y. Baynard
Assistant to Vice President
Nuclear Operations

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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