

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					CAT												

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | In mode 5, the Plant Fire Marshall discovered a fire barrier penetration seal in
03 | the RHR pump 1-1 room non-functional in violation of Technical Specification
04 | 3.7.10. It was determined that the penetration was non-functional from 11/15/83
05 | to 12/05/83 without a fire watch being stationed. Fire barriers providing
06 | separation between redundant RHR pumps remained functional. This event has
07 | in no way affected the public's health and safety. Reportable per Technical
08 | Specification 6.9.1.12b.

09		SYSTEM CODE A B		CAUSE CODE A	CAUSE SUBCODE B	COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z				COMP. SUBCODE Z	VALVE SUBCODE Z
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
17		EVENT YEAR 8 3		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 2		OCCURRENCE CODE / 0 1		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 0	
19		20		21		22		23		24	
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION Z		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y	
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Maintenance personnel did not locate the fire penetration due to insufficient

1 1 information on the work request. On 12/05/83, a fire watch was established and

1 2 on 12/09/83 the penetration was resealed. Personnel responsible for writing

1 3 the work request were counseled on the importance of clearly specifying the

1 4 work to maintain compliance with the Tech Specs.

1 5 H 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 A 31 Fire Marshall Observation 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) NA NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION
1	7	0	0	0
37	7	38		NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES						(41)
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION		
1	8	0	0	0	(40)	NA

8 9 10 11 12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
1 9 Z (42) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12
IE 22
11

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NA

2 0 N (44)

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Jacqueline R. Hinds

PHONE 805-595-7351

8401040185 831219
PDR ADCK 05000275
S PDR

ATTACHMENT TO
LER 83-032/01T-0
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-275
LICENSE NO. DPR-76

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

The subject fire barrier is a foam seal around a pipe penetration in the ceiling of fire area 3-B-1 (RHR Pump 1-1 room) which communicates with fire area 3-B-3 (BIT room) above. The foam sealant was removed during support modification work and the penetration was not resealed after completion of the modification. Fire suppression and detection systems in fire area 3-B-1 were operable during this time period. Although hourly patrols were not formally established, prior to December 5, these fire areas were frequently visited by plant personnel. Fire barriers providing separation between redundant RHR pumps remained functional.

In reviewing the previous fire penetrations work requests, it was determined that they all provided sufficient information concerning fire penetrations. PGandE believes that this particular LER represents an isolated case.

RECEIVED
NPC

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

1983 DEC 21 AM 10:25
17 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910-372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

REGION V

December 19, 1983

Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
License Event Report 83-032/01-T
Non-functional Fire Barrier Penetration Seal

Dear Mr. Martin:

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12b of the Technical Specifications, Appendix A to the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Operating License, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted concerning the discovery of non-functional fire barrier penetration seal.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: G. W. Knighton

Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

Service List

IE-22
1/1